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Abstract
Cognitive radio networks provide an effective solution for improving spectrum
usage for wireless users. In particular, secondary users can now compete with each
other to access idle, unused spectrum from licensed primary users in an opportunistic
fashion. This is typically done by using cognitive radios to sense the presence of
primary users and tuning to unused spectrum bands to boost efficiency. Expectedly,
resource allocation is a very crucial concern in such settings, i.e., power and rate
control, and various studies have looked at this problem area. However, the existing
body of work has mostly considered the interactions between secondary users and
has ignored the impact of primary user behaviors.
Along these lines, this dissertation addresses this crucial concern and proposes
a novel primary-secondary game-theoretic solution which rewards primary users for
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sharing their spectrum with secondary users. In particular, a key focus is on precisely
modeling the performance of realistic channel models with fading. This is of key
importance as simple additive white Gaussian noise channels are generally not very
realistic and tend to yield overly optimistic results.
Hence the proposed solution develops a realistic non-cooperative power control
game to optimize transmit power in wireless cognitive radios networks running code
division multiple access up-links. This model is then analyzed for fast and slow
flat fading channels. Namely, the fading coefficients are modeled using Rayleigh
and Rician distributions, and closed-form expressions are derived for the average
utility functions. Furthermore, it is also shown that the strategy spaces of the
users under realistic conditions must be modified to guarantee the existence of a
unique Nash Equilibrium point. Finally, linear pricing is introduced into the average
utility functions for both Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels, i.e., to further
improve the proposed models and minimize transmission power for all users. Detailed
simulations are then presented to verify the performance of the schemes under the
proposed realistic channel models. The results are also compared to those with more
basic additive white Gaussian noise channels.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Background

Wireless networks use electromagnetic waves, e.g., such as radio transmissions, to
carry information. Unlike wired infrastructures, these setups enable tetherless communication and provide unprecedented freedom of mobility for users. Now over the
years, wireless networking technologies have seen tremendous levels of innovation,
evolving from basic voice-only capabilities to full-fledged multimedia paradigms,
i.e., voice, video, and data. As a result, wireless communications has become an
entrenched facet of modern society, and users are continuing to demand faster and
more reliable wireless connectivity. This push, in part, is being driven by the massive commoditization (price reduction) of high-speed and power-efficient computing
technologies.
Now in general, there are several key resources in wireless networking environments. A foremost resource is the available spectrum to carry user transmissions,
i.e., bandwidth. For the most part, access to this spectrum is tightly regulated by
governmental (and also international) agencies, i.e., as defined by licensed bands
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for 2G, 3G and 4G wireless technologies. For example in the United States, all
commercial spectrum allocation is done by the Federal Communication Commission
(FCC). In addition, another key resource in wireless networks is user power. This
contrasts with wired networks as most mobile terminals handset devices are batterypowered. Finally, computing power (on a mobile devices) is also another key resource
and can impact the the type of processing/transmission that can be done.
Overall, given the highly-controlled nature of spectrum allocation and limited
power resources on most mobile platforms, commensurate resource allocation issues
are of paramount importance [1]. These challenges are further compounded by the
myriad of transmission concerns in wireless settings, e.g., propagation losses, fading,
multi-path, etc. As a result, a full range of schemes have been studied over the years,
e.g., modulation, power/rate control, and coding [1], [8].
Nevertheless, many studies have shown that sizable portions of the allocated
spectrum are not utilized in many cases. For example, a recent FCC study revealed
that almost 90-95% of frequency bands are either unoccupied most of the time or only
partially occupied [2]. Indeed this inefficient usage of allocated spectrum is major
cause for concern, as in general, increased user demands are mandating increased
bandwidth resources. Hence in order to resolve this concern, dynamic spectrum
access (DSA) strategies have been proposed. Namely, the overall goal here is to
allow users to share unused spectrum from designated (but idle) users. Specifically,
wireless network users are segmented into two groups, primary users (PUs) and
secondary users (SUs). Here, the PUs own the allocated spectrum but allow SUs to
share it, essentially letting them act as a source of interference. Hence hierarchical
access models have been introduced to perform efficient power control in order to
reduce the amount of interference, i.e., by reducing the power consumed at PU and
SUs terminals, see [3] and [4].
Now the cognitive radio (CR) concept leverages DSA strategies to help improve
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spectrum utilization efficiency. Here the SUs are allowed to sense and tune to (access)
unused parts of the licensed spectrum, i.e., by learning, observing, and reconfiguring
their radio systems to capitalize on unused spectral bands [5]. A key goal in CR
networks is to ensure that associated interference levels are kept in line with the
quality of service (QoS) requirements of all users, particularly PUs. In addition,
when the PU of a given channel (band) returns, the SUs must vacate the channel,
i.e., termed as forced termination. Here the SUs may shift to other available channel
bands and recover from the forced termination state, i.e., termed as spectrum handoff. In this setup the SUs are serviced when the channels are free, resulting in higher
spectrum utilization. Furthermore, since the availability of the spectrum depends
upon the PUs’ traffic, the number of SUs serviced also varies with the PU’s traffic
usage. Hence the amount of service that can be squeezed out of the free spectral
bands is called the capacity of the SUs.
Overall the field of CR networking has seen much growth in recent years, especially with the advent of software defined radio (SDR) devices. In general, the
operation of CR is summarized in five steps [6]: observe, orient, decide, act, and
learn. Here DSA systems can sense the operating environment, return a value for
the sensing result, vary the operating parameters, learn from the past experience
and current states, and also use predictive capabilities to help further improve
transmission behaviors (at the PUs and SUs). Along these lines, various gametheoretic models have recently been developed for PU/SU transmission behaviors
and used to analyze decision making processes in CR networks [5], [6].

1.2

Motivation

In general, most the game-theoretic studies in CR have looked at power control
performance under additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels model [7]. Al-
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beit insightful, these models do not adequately account for the impact of a range of
real-world wireless channel impairments, e.g., such as fading, frequency selectivity,
interference, nonlinearity, or dispersion of channels upon the total performance of
power control algorithms. Moreover, AWGN channels are generally not considered
as good models for most terrestrial wireless links because of added effects such as
multi-path, terrain blocking, interference, etc. As such, they tend to give overlyoptimistic results which generally may not reflect real-world conditions. Nevertheless,
these models do provide simple baseline mathematical frameworks which give some
insights into the underlying behavior of certain systems (before these other more
complex phenomena are considered).
In addition, many game-theoretic studies have tended to focus on broader aspects
of the CR problem by modeling multiple PUs. As such, there is a critical need to
focus on more challenging channel types, and address power control issues under
more focused, realistic conditions. Indeed, the application of game theory in this
context is a largely unaddressed and open issue. In particular, it is very plausible
that space diversity techniques may be able to take advantage of random fading
channels here, i.e., multiple antennas. Namely, the likelihood that all channels are
in deep fading is less than that for a single channel, i.e., information may still be
conveyed through other channels. This forms the key motivation for this effort.

1.3

Proposed Work

Based upon the above, this dissertation extends the game-theoretic modeling of CR
networks by focusing on a host of realistic concerns. First of all, power allocation
is considered for fast-flat fading channels models, including Rayleigh and Rician
channels. Next, slow-flat fading channels models are also studied for both Rayleigh
and Rician channels. In both cases, these models are further verified using numerical
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simulations to gauge the impact on average utility functions. Further comparisons
are also done with results for more basic AWGN channel models. Finally, linear
pricing is also added to the utility functions to further improve performance in CR
networks. The results of this approach are then compared to the case of utility
function without pricing. This completes the study of power allocation for realistic
CR networks.

1.4

Dissertation Outline

Overall, this dissertation is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 presents a broad
survey of related areas. Namely, several key wireless communication channel models
are introduced. Cognitive radios, spectrum sharing, and game theory are then briefly
presented. Finally, a general literature review is presented for related topic areas and
a realistic system model is outlined for further development.
Next, Chapter 3 proposes realistic game-theoretic formulations for CR networks
under fast-flat fading channels models, i.e., both Rayleigh and Rician distributions.
Here, modified game schemes are presented and their utility functions are derived.
The existence and uniqueness of the associated Nash Equilibrium (NE) for these
games are also proved to guarantee that the models are convergent under the bestresponse adaptation. The findings are further augmented with numerical analysis
results for the spectrum sharing model under both types of fading channels behaviors.
Chapter 4 then addresses realistic games under slow-flat fading channels models,
again for both Rayleigh and Rician distributions. The existence and uniqueness of
the NE for both of these cases is also shown and numerical analysis presented.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces the concept of pricing and studies realistic games
under Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels models. Specifically, linear pric-
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ing is studied and its superiority over games without pricing is shown. Conclusions
and directions for future work are then presented in Chapter 6 to conclude the effort.

6

Chapter 2
Background Survey

This chapter presents a background review of topics and areas relating to the gametheoretic modeling of CR wireless networks. In particular, some of the key wireless
channel models are reviewed first, including fading types. Next, CR networking
concepts are highlighted, with a focus on hierarchical access models. The overall
area of game theory is then briefed, including the concepts of NE and utility pricing.
Finally, a detailed survey is presented on the latest work in game theoretic modeling
of CR networks. This background is then used to motivate a realistic model for
fading channels, which is further revisited and developed in the subsequent chapters
of this dissertation.

2.1

Wireless Channel Models

In general, the term wireless networking is quite generic and many different types
have been developed. For example, many commercial wireless networks, i.e., cellular,
make extensive use of wired networking technologies to interconnect wireless access
point (AP) and/or base station (BS) nodes. In such settings, only the first and
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last-hop transmissions occur over the wireless medium, i.e., user handsets sending/receiving to/form AP nodes. By contrast other types of wireless networks, such
as mobile ad-hoc networks or sensor networks, can be fully wireless and may not
support any wired links/transmissions whatsoever.
Regardless of the settings, however, wireless links (or channels) are generally
where the most transmission degradation tends to occur. As such, these segments
determine the capacity and general performance of the end-to-end network. This
is due to the fact that wireless channels represent natural mediums which are not
necessarily optimized for data transmissions, e.g., versus more predictable man-made
media such as copper, coaxial, or fiber optic cable. Therefore, random fluctuations in
wireless channels can severely degrade the overall performance of wireless networks.
As a result, much effort has been devoted towards building realistic, probabilistic
models for wireless transmission channels, and then using these models to study
data network transmission behaviors. Nevertheless, these channels models also make
wireless network design much more complicated, i.e., with regards to resource allocation (power and rate control) [1]. Further consider the details here.
Wireless signals typically travel from a transmitter to a receiver over multiple
reflective paths. This phenomenon, called multi-path fading, can cause fluctuations
in the received signal’s amplitude, phase, and angle of arrival. As such, wireless
channel models (i.e., for mobile radio) can be classified into two main categories
contingent to the wavelength, λ, of the carrier radio wave, i.e., large-scale fading
and small-scale fading models. The former models slow variations in the signal
power over time, and commonly uses log-normal signal representations, i.e., which
depend upon the position of the user and the presence of obstacles in the signal
path. Meanwhile, the latter models the amplitude of the faded channel using Rician
or Rayleigh random distributions [46] in order to capture the effects of a large
number of multiple reflective paths, i.e., with or without dominant line of sight
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(LOS) propagation path. These two models are now discussed further.

2.1.1

Large-Scale Models

In general, large-scale models predict average channel behaviors over distances much
greater than the operating wavelength. As a result, these models are generally
considered as frequency-independent and are functions of distance and other environmental features [1]. Now some specific theoretical large-scale models include the
free-space model, reflection model, diffraction model, and scattering model. Various
experimental models have also been developed, including log-normal shadowing,
outdoor propagation, and indoor propagation. For more details, please refer to [1]
and [8].
However, the study in this dissertation does not consider the effects of largescale fading channels. The key reason here is that these models are more relevant
for longer-term issues such as cell site planning, and less for communication system
design [9]. As a result the focus here is instead upon addressing much more temporal
concerns/challenges caused by more rapidly changing channels. These models are
discussed next.

2.1.2

Small-Scale Models

Small-scale fading models capture signal variations on a scale of the carrier wavelength itself. Here Doppler frequency shift and multi-path fading effects are the
main causes of fading, i.e., defined as the rapid change in a signal’s strength over a
short distance or short length of time. Hence fading is a time-variant and frequencydependent phenomenon. Now Doppler’s frequency shift can occur due to a wireless
user’s movement. Namely, this frequency shift can be positive when a mobile user
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moves toward the base station and negative if the mobile user moves away from the
base station. Meanwhile, the frequency shift for each ray in a multi-path environment
may be different as well. In turn, this leads to a spread in frequencies at the receiver.
Hence the maximum Doppler shift, termed as the Doppler spread (Bd ), is given by:
Bd =

v
λ

(2.1)

where v is the speed of the the mobile user.
Now the time duration over which the wireless channel’s impulse response is
considered to be invariant is defined as the coherence time (Tc ) and is given by:
Tc =

c
Bd

(2.2)

where c is constant. Thus if two signals arrive at the receiver with a time separation
greater than Tc , then the channel will affect both signals separately. Therefore a
baseband signal of symbol period (Ts ) greater than Tc will be distorted because the
channel will vary during the transmission of this signal. Moreover, the interference
between two or more versions of the transmitted signal (which arrive at slightly
different times) is also termed as multi-path fading. Thus rapid changes to the signal
strength can occur over a relatively short time interval or small distance. Moreover,
random frequency modulation can also occur due to time dispersion caused by multipath propagation delays and varying Doppler frequency shifts (in different multi-path
signals).
Now generally, two key parameters are used to measure the time dispersion
of multi-path components; the power-delay profile and root mean square (RMS).
Namely, the power delay profile (or multi-path intensity profile) is defined as the
average power associated with a given multi-path delay [8]. In general, the powerdelay profile is represented as a plot of relative received power as a function of excess
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delay with respect to a fixed time-delay reference. Using this, the mean excess delay
is defined as the first moment of the power-delay profile as follows [1]:
X

a2n τn

n
τ̄ = X

(2.3)

a2n

n

where an is the amplitude of the n-th multi-path component and τn is its corresponding delay. Meanwhile, the RMS is given by the square root of the second control
moment of the power-delay profile and is given as follows:

στ =

p

τ̄ 2 − (τ̄ )2

(2.4)

where
X
τ̄ 2 =

a2n τk

n

X

a2n

2

(2.5)

n

It is important to note that the values of RMS delay spread (στ ) can range from
microseconds in outdoor mobile radio channels to nanoseconds in indoor mobile radio
channels.
Furthermore, to better characterize the channel in the frequency domain, a
coherence bandwidth (Bc ) parameter is also defined as an analog to the delay spread
parameter in the time domain. Namely, the coherence bandwidth is defined as the
range of frequencies over which the channel is assumed to be flat. Therefore the
frequency components can have strong amplitude correlation, and if the correlation
between two multi-path components is above 0.9, then the coherence bandwidth is
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given by:
Bc =

1
50στ

(2.6)

However, if the correlation is greater than 0.5, the above equation can be resolved
to:
Bc =

1
5στ

(2.7)

To summarize, the coherence bandwidth and delay spread describe the time
dispersive nature of the channel in a local area. By contrast, the Doppler spread and
coherence time describe the time-varying nature of the channel caused by relative
motion of transmitter and receiver in a small-scale region. Moreover, Bc and Ts are
termed as signal parameters, while στ and Bd are termed as channel parameters.
Furthermore, small-scale fading channels can further be classified into two groups;
frequency selective fading and flat fading channels. Hence a band-limited transmit
signal either sees a frequency-selective channel or a flat frequency channel (nonselective). In particular, this depends upon the transmitted signal bandwidth and
symbol period as compared to coherence bandwidth and RMS delay spread, respectively. Namely, if the signal bandwidth is much less than the coherence bandwidth
(i.e., narrow-band channel) and the RMS delay spread is much less than symbol
period, then the channel is said to be flat fading frequency channel. Otherwise
it called a frequency-selective channel, which is much more difficult to model as
compared to flat fading channels. Moreover, based upon coherence time (which
results from Doppler spread), small-scale fading can be sorted into two main groups;
fast-flat fading and slow-flat fading. Consider these in more details.
Fast-flat fading channels incorporate higher Doppler spread, and here the symbol
period is generally greater than the coherence time, i.e., Bs < Bd . Therefore the
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channel impulse response variations are much faster than the baseband signal variations. On the other hand, the Doppler spread for slow fading channel is low and
the coherence time is greater than the symbol period. Thus channel variations are
considered to be lower than baseband signal variations. In other words the channel
does not change during each signal symbol. Hence the velocity of the a wireless user
(i.e., mobile user) and/or the velocity of the objects in the channel and the baseband
signal determine whether a signal undergoes fast or slow fading.
In general, wireless channels can take advantage of multi-path and Doppler effects
to characterize their time and frequency characteristics. However, this is not sufficient
and further analysis is usually necessary to capture the statistical characteristics
of randomly-varying amplitudes. Therefore several popular channel models have
been developed to describe small-scale fading channels for mobile users in wireless
code division multiple access (CDMA) networks. These include Rayleigh fading
channels and Rician fading channels [10, 11]. Namely, Rayleigh models describe
the envelope distribution of the received signal for channels that contains no LOS
components. Conversely, if one of the multi-path components of the channels has a
LOS component, Rician distributions are used instead to describe the envelope of
the received signal. Note that Nakagami distributions, which have more degrees of
freedom, can also give more accurate models, i.e., control over fading for more dense
scatters. Consider Rayleigh and Rician models further [10, 11].
Rayleigh Fading Channels: Here the BS is assumed to be far away from scatterers and the users are surrounded by infinitely many scatterers, e.g., such as indoor
environments where there can be many furniture items or walls. Furthermore, given
N users within a cell, the fading coefficient αi is defined by a Rayleigh probability
density function (pdf) given by:
αi − α2i2
p(αi ) = 2 e 2σ
σ
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for αi ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. In particular, σ is the RMS value of the received
voltage signal before envelope detection, and σ 2 is the time-average power of the
received signal before envelope detection. In other words, σ 2 = E[0.5(αi2 )] is the
measure of the spread of the distribution. Therefore σ is the only parameter that
the Rayleigh pdf uses to characterize the channel, i.e., one degree of freedom only.
However, other channels, such as the Nakagami model, represent two degrees of
freedom [11]. In general, the Rayleigh distribution is used to describe the statistical
time varying nature of the received envelope of an individual multi-path component
generated mainly from scatterers.

Rician fading channels: In this model, the main contribution of the received signal
is due to a direct path, i.e., LOS between the BS and the users. Namely, the fading
coefficient αi has a Rician pdf given by:
p(αi ) =

αi −( α2i +s2 2 ) αi s
e 2σ I0 ( 2 ) i = 1, . . . , N
σ2
σ

(2.9)

for αi ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. In particular, s2 represents the power in the non-fading
signal components or LOS (dominant) component, which is also known as the noncentrality parameter of the pdf. Meanwhile, I0 (.) is the zero-order modified first-kind
Bessel function. Overall, (αi /σ)2 has a non-central chi-square distribution with two
degrees of freedom (i.e., s and σ) and non-centrality parameter (s/σ)2 . Furthermore,
the Rician distribution is also defined in terms of a K-factor, also termed as Rician
factor, i.e., K = 0.5(s/σ)2 . In particular, this factor is defined as the ratio of signal
power in the dominant component (the deterministic signal power) over the (localmean) scattered power or the variance of the multi-path. Note the Rician density
function degenerates to a Rayleigh distribution when the dominant component fades
away.
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Cognitive Radio (CR) Networks

The CR concept was first introduced in 1998 by Joseph Mitola and subsequently
published in 1999 [6]. In essence, CR embodies a fully-reconfigurable wireless setup,
in which a transmission device’s communication parameters can be changed automatically to adapt to varying user or operator needs [12]. Overall, CR is a very promising
paradigm for wireless telecommunications networks as mobile users can change their
transmission and reception parameters (i.e., power or rate) to communicate in a more
efficient manner and avoid interference with licensed PUs and unlicensed SUs. This
can be achieved by monitoring several parameters in the radio environment, such
as wireless network state, mobile user’s behavior, and radio frequency spectrum.
Now the FCC has found that even though many cellular bands are overloaded,
other frequency bands are not, e.g., such as those assigned for paging and military
frequencies. Hence, CR techniques are very attractive here as they allows users to
circumvent the limitations of basic fixed spectrum allocation schemes, i.e., where
unlicensed users are not allowed to use idle frequencies assigned to other users or
services.
Overall, two types of CR spectrum allocations are possible, licensed band and
unlicensed band. In particular, the former allows CR users to access bands assigned to
licensed users which are different from unlicensed bands. Meanwhile the latter allows
users to only use unlicensed bands. As a result, CR can be very promising in DSA
environments, as PUs and SUs can change their transmission/reception parameters
to improve spectrum efficiency and also minimize interference, i.e., power, rate. This
can be done by monitoring several radio parameters, i.e., such as network state,
mobile user behaviors, RF spectrum usages, etc. Along these lines, the key functions
in CR networks generally include the following [12]:
Spectrum Sensing: This function allows SUs in CR to detect idle spectrum
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bands. The goal here is to sense the presence of PU transmissions and find gaps in
spectrum usage. In particular, transmitter detection is one of the many techniques
used in spectrum sensing, i.e., to determine if a PU signal is present within a certain
spectrum band [12].
Spectrum Management: This function determines the best available spectrum
band for SU transmission. The objective here is to ensure proper selection so as
to meet the QoS requirements of both PUs and SUs, without introducing excessive
levels of interference.
Spectrum Mobility: This function handless frequency exchange between SUs. The
aim here is to allow dynamic spectral usage for users to operate in the best frequency
band.
It is also important to note how SUs actually make use of idle spectral resources.
In particular, two DSA approaches have been proposed, spectrum overlay and spectrum underlay.The former scheme only allows SUs to utilize idle band gaps in the
usable spectrum, i.e., called white spaces. Now since the SUs have to search for
these bands, collisions can occur if there are errors in the sensing and detection
processes. Meanwhile, spectrum underlay techniques allow SUs to use the whole
usable spectrum, as long as they control their transmission behaviors to limit the
total interference levels i.e., QoS degradation for PU. The proposed effort herein
makes use of this approach, although it can also be adapted for spectrum overlay
operation. Note that other more specialized DSA approaches are also possible, i.e.,
such as open sharing models [13, 14] and dynamic exclusive models [15–18] etc.
Finally, it is noted that power control is also a crucial aspect in CR networks (and
wireless networks in general). Specifically, since wireless users communicate via an
air interface over a common shared medium, power control is a problem that affects
all users (PU and SUs). In general, each user’s transmission power can be considered

16

Chapter 2.

Background Survey

as source of interference for all the other users, as it can deteriorate their signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR). In addition, power control is also required since
data transmission consumes valuable (limited) battery life.
Now typically the goal for most users is to achieve a high SINR while expending
the smallest amount of energy. Hence there is a clear trade-off between achieving
high SINR levels and lowering energy consumption in CR networks. As a result, the
key focus of power control algorithms is to find a good balance between these two
objectives. Namely, it is considered to be an effective resource-allocation scenario to
compact co-channel interference and fading channel. Here, power control algorithms
must also adjust the transmission power according to channel conditions in order to
maintain acceptable QoS, i.e., received signal power. Furthermore, the QoS levels
can also vary based upon user service type. For example basic voice services can
suffice with minimum acceptable SINR support. However, higher-bandwidth data
services will mandate larger SINR values to support error-free communication. This
is because of the direct dependence on data transmission error probabilities.

2.3

Game Theory Overview

Game theory is a mathematical tool that is used to study the interactions between
rational and intelligent players in a game. Here a rational player is defined as one
whose behavior is consistent with maximizing its own expected utility [1]. In addition
an intelligent player is also one who knows everything about the structure of the
game, i.e., including the fact that the other players are rational and intelligent.
Overall, game theory has been widely used to study problems in diverse fields such
as biology, economics, defense, politics, and even resource allocation in CR/wireless
networks. Consider some further details.
In general, a strategic game G is defined using the following three key elements:
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1) Finite set (i.e., group) of rational players, denoted as N = {1, . . . , N }.
2) An action space or strategy space, A = (A1 × A2 × . . . × AN ), from which
players chooses their actions (i.e., the Cartesian product of each player’s action set).
3) A set of utility functions that describes the players’ preferences over all possible
game outcomes. A real number is assigned to every possible game outcome with
property that a higher (or lower) number implies that the outcome of the game is
more desirable. Therefore, the utility is a direct function of the game outcome.
Now in general, a strategic game can be defined as being static or dynamic.
In static games, the interaction between users only occurs once. Conversely, in
dynamic games multiple user interactions can occur in the action space. Overall,
game-theoretic models offer some notable advantages [1]:
• Since players observe outcomes and respond to optimize their own gains, there is
no need to collect global information and perform constrained optimization. Instead
local information is sufficient here.
• Since local information (at the players) is always accurate, the outcome of the
distributed game is always robust. This contrasts with other optimization models
that can yield sub-optimal results with inaccurate global information.
• Game theory is better suited for handling combinatorial problems as compared to
traditional optimization techniques. Namely, it formulates and handles the problem
in a discretized manner, i.e., such as the strategic form.
The above-said, however, game theory also has some disadvantages:
• It is generally harder to formulate a reasonable utility function in all cases, i.e.,
since this function must have a physical meaning and the outcome of the game may
be non-trivial.
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• Players may have multiple objectives, and the strategic influences of all users must
be incorporated (otherwise there will be no conflicts).
• Game theory can give lower efficiency outcomes as compared to centralized optimization strategies. Specifically, since players tend to optimize their own gains in a
greedy manner, this can yield higher resource usage. Hence cooperative incentivebased techniques have been developed to improve outcome efficiency, i.e., repeated
games, pricing, etc. Namely, incentives are given for distributed users to cooperate
to arrive at more efficient solution.
Now as noted earlier in Chapter 1, game theory has been used to model wireless
CR networks settings as well. In particular, the actual users (PUs, SUs) now can
take the role of players trying to maximize their utilities. In turn, the utilities here
are defined as a function of transmission power, transmission rate, energy or any
combination of these.

2.3.1

Nash Equilibrium (NE)

A key concept in game theory is that of the NE. Specifically, the NE is defined as a
steady-state concept where all players in a game have no further incentive to change
their actions. Namely, consider a game with N players and an action (strategy)
strategy vector b = [b1 ....bN ], where bi is the i-th player’s strategy. In addition, the
strategy vector of the i-th player’s opponents is given by b−i = [b1 ...bi−1 bi+1 ...bN ]
and the i-th player’s utility is given by ui . Using this the NE point b is defined as
[1]:
ui (bi , b−i ) ≥ ui (b∗i , b−i ), i = 1, . . . , N
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In general, a game is said to have a solution if there exists at least one NE for it.
As a result no player can further increase its utility alone by changing its strategy,
i.e., no further incentive to action. Therefore if any user tries to change its strategy,
this will lead to reduced utility for that user (as compared to maintaining its current
strategy).

2.3.2

Utility with Pricing

As mentioned above, utility pricing concepts have also been used to improve game
theory formulations. The goal here is to introduce appropriate pricing (or taxation)
policies in order to incentivize players to cooperate with each other and improve
game outcomes. As such, this entices players to cooperate in the game to get an
optimal solution for resource usage.
Now generally speaking, each individual player would like to maximize its utility,
concurrent with paying the smallest price for using a resource. Hence each user
would like to maximize the difference between its utility and the pricing function [1].
However, this may yield multiple NE points, and hence a key goal in pricing-based
games is to change the rules to prevent multiple players from falling into less-efficient
NE points. For the case of CR networks, pricing will cause the NE point to shift
transmission powers to lower values as compared to games without pricing. This will
help to increase the utility values obtained, and hence more SUs can be supported
in the network. It is also worthwhile to mention that that increased transmission
power has nothing to do to lower error rates, and in fact will only results in increased
energy usage (wastage) [1].
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Literature Review in Game-Theoretic Approaches
for Cognitive Radios

Various studies have looked at improving the bandwidth (i.e., spectrum utilization)
efficiency of static spectrum allocation schemes in wireless CR networks, i.e., to
allow SUs to compete and access white spaces in licensed spectrum bands already
allocated to PUs. Expectedly, power control is critical concern in such settings, as
SUs must ensure that they do not introduce excessive levels of interference so as
to degrade the QoS of the PUs and also the other SUs. Along these lines, various
power control schemes have been proposed, see [24], many of which have used gametheoretic techniques to model the interactions between users in CR networks, i.e., by
treating them as rational decision makers.
The first game-theoretic model for power control in wireless data networks was
presented in [25]. In particular, a framework was developed for distributed power
control based upon economic concepts of utility and pricing, with the goal of maximizing the utility of each user. Meanwhile an alternate approach was outlined in [26]
using energy efficient utility functions to derive unique NE points. In particular, this
work modeled power control in wireless data network as a non-cooperative power
control game and defined the user’s utility function as the ratio of throughput to
transmit power. Building upon this, the concept of Pareto efficiency was introduced
in [27] to further handle non-optimal NE cases. Specifically, a linear pricing function
(in transmit power) was used to improve the distributed power control game and
gain better overall performance. In [27, 28], the authors also used pricing functions
to obtain a more efficient solution for the power control game. Next, the work in [29]
outlined a more specialized game-theoretic model for handling linear minimum mean
squared error (LMMSE) receivers, and results showed convergence to a unique NE
owing to the quasi-concavity property of the utility function. Further QoS-related
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constraints were also introduced into a game-theoretic formulation in [30] in which
users were allow to choose their transmit powers as well as constellation sizes to
maximize utility.
Furthermore, some motivation for using game theory in communication system
were also provided by the authors in [32], especially in power control problem. The
authors in [33] also defined the utility function as S-shaped (sigmoid) function of the
user’s SINR. Note that earlier resource allocation algorithms for wireless networks
have also used non-game theory approaches, where each user allocates their own
resources (i.e., power and data rate) iteratively based upon local measurements to
meet SINR constraints. See also other studies [34–37]. However, using a game
theoretic approach allows each user to choose their own transmit power level or data
rate efficiently in such a way as to optimize the total interference introduced to other
users.
Now the authors in [31] considered both power and rate control using a game
theoretical approach, where the SUs are only considered as active players in the
game. Furthermore, an opportunistic power adaptive method for SUs was proposed
in [38]. In this method authors made key relaxation in terms of synchronization
and perfect channel state information requirements, which are very useful for fading
channels. Next, a joint power control and beam-forming scheme using either weighted
least squares or admission control was proposed in [39]. In [6] it was shown that CR
is good candidate for realizing dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) due to its ability
to observe, learn from, and orient to the observed radio frequency environment.
Moreover, [40] also presented a game theoretical overview for DSS techniques.
Furthermore, since managing the interference level is the responsibility of the
secondary system, either by spectrum overlay or by spectrum underlay DSA, the
authors in [15] conducted research in DSA networks to analyze the network users’
behaviors, optimality, and fairness among the SUs. Finally, a game-theoretic scheme
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was also proposed in [41] to achieve power control amongst SUs, where potential
games and S-modular games were applied to perform resource allocation in CR
networks. Namely, a target SINR game model was introduced to provide each SU
with an acceptable SINR while maintaining the SUs’ transmission power limited.
However, in this formulation the PUs were not considered as decision makers in the
overall spectrum sharing process. Hence, these schemes are essentially similar to the
power control schemes in traditional wireless networks. For more details on gametheoretic approaches in wireless networks for energy efficient resource allocations
schemes, please refer to [42] and [43].
Note that power control in CR networks has also been investigated based upon
other methods rather than game theory, see [44], [45]. In particular, a more efficient
branch and bound algorithm was proposed in [44] for optimal power control in a
CR network, while [45] introduced an adherence to hierarchies between primary and
secondary users in a peer-to-peer CR network through distributed power control.

Figure 2.1: The primary-secondary user communications system model [10]
Although the above studies represent a good set of contributions in the CR field,
these game-theoretic strategies have only considered interactions between the SUs.
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As a result, it is crucial to further incorporate the behavior of the PUs in the power
control formulations as well in order to further improve the transmission performance
of SUs and also avoid deleterious impacts on QoS. Along these lines, a novel power
control scheme was proposed in [7], in which PUs were also treated as decision
makers (see Figure 2.1). Namely, PUs were rewarded (i.e., monetarily) to leave a
reasonable portion of their spectrum to share amongst the SUs, i.e., assuming that
they can first meet their own minimum required QoS requirements, measured as
SINR. Concurrently, the SUs were required to achieve energy-efficient transmission
without causing excessive levels of interference to the PUs.
In particular, the above objectives were achieved by setting a reasonable interference cap (Q0 ) for SU transmissions and severely penalizing PUs if their transmissions
did not achieve a minimum QoS level. However the work in [7] did not consider the
impact of channel fading, and instead focused on simpler AWGN channels which
are generally considered as poor models. Along these lines, this dissertation extends
upon this primary-secondary formulation to model the performance of the scheme
under realistic channel conditions. Specifically, operation is considered for direct
sequence-code division multiple access (DS-CDMA) CR wireless network settings in
which there is a single PU and multiple SUs.

2.5

Proposed Realistic System Model

Based upon the above review, a realistic system framework and notation for CR networks is now proposed. This baseline is then developed and expanded in subsequent
chapters of this dissertation. Overall, the main focus here is on capturing the impact
of fading channel behaviors. Hence in order to better focus on this concern, only the
single PU case is treated, i.e., one PU and multiple SUs sharing a cell. Consider the
notation here.
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Here the model is formulated as a game with N users (players). Next, the cross
correlation coefficients between the signaling waveforms of the i-th SU and that of
a PU is denoted by ρip , between a PU and the i-th SU is by ρpi , and between the
i-th and the j-th SUs by ρji , for all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Without loss of generality,
it is also assumed that ρip = ρpi = ρji . Meanwhile, the channel gain between the
i-th SU and the common secondary receiver is given by hsi , between the i-th SU and
the primary receiver by hpi , between the PU and the primary receiver by hp0 , and
between the PU and the common secondary receiver by hs0 . Further more, assuming
a matched filter (MF) detector is used at the primary receiver, the target SINR of
the PU is determined by its transmission quality as [7]:
h2p0 P0 α02
γ¯0 =
Q0 + σn2

(2.11)

where α0 represents the path fading coefficient between the PU and the primary
receiver, σn2 the variance of the AWGN at the primary receiver, and P0 the PU’s
transmission power. Since Q0 is the maximum possible interference from all SUs
that the PU is willing to tolerate, γ¯0 represents the least acceptable transmission
quality of the PU. Hence the PU’s actual SINR is given by:
γ0 (P ) = PN

h2p0 P0 α02

2 2
2
2
i=1 hpi ρsp pi αi + σn

where I0 =

PN

i=1

=

h2p0 P0 α02
I0 + σn2

(2.12)

h2pi ρ2sp pi αi2 is the total interference from all SUs to PU and pi is the

i-th SU’s transmit power. Hence by using Eq.(2.11) one gets:
γ0 (P ) = PN

i=1

γ¯0 Q0
h2pi ρ2sp pi αi2 + σn2

+ PN

i=1

γ¯0 σn2
h2pi ρ2sp pi αi2 + σn2

(2.13)

Similarly, the i-th SU’s received SINR at the common secondary receiver is given
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by:
γi (s) = PN

h2si pi αi2

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj αj2 + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 α02 + σn2

(2.14)

For simplicity’s sake, Ii is also defined to be the total interference introduced to
the i-th user from the PU and all other SUs, i.e.,

Ii =

N
X

h2sj ρ2ji pj αj2 + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 α02

(2.15)

j=1
j6=i

Hence by using Eq.(2.15), one can rewrite Eq. (2.14) as follows:
γi (s) =

h2si pi αi2
= Ai αi2 , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N
Ii + σn2

(2.16)

Finally, assuming non-coherent binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) transmission,
(s)

the bit error rate (BER) given γi

and Ii for the i-th user is given by [46];
(s)

1 γi
P̃b (e) = e− 2
2
(s)

The conditional bit error rate given γi

(2.17)

and Ii which is derived above will be used

extensively in this dissertation.

In general, for fast-flat fading channels, the path fading coefficient is not constant
over the packet duration. However, it is generally assumed that fading levels are still
constant over single bit durations. Hence, for the m-th bit in the packet, one can
rewrite Eq. (2.16) as follows [3], [47]:
γi (s) (m) =

h2si pi αi2 (m)
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N
Ii (m) + σn2
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where
Ii (m) =

N
X

h2sj ρ2ji pj αj2 (m) + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 α02 (m)

(2.19)

j=1
j6=i

Now consider the derivation of the average bit error rate, denoted by Pe , for each
bit in the packet and the average utility functions are evaluated for both Rayleigh
(and Rician) fast-flat fading channels. In order to find Pe , it is assumed that both
αi2 (m) and Ii (m), are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, and αi2 (m) and Ii (m) are independent random variables for m = 1, 2, . . . , M ,
where M is the number of bits in one packet.
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Fading is a major concern in wireless transmission networks. This natural phenomenon occurs due to changes in the attenuation levels of a transmitted signal. In
general, fading is a time-varying process and can be affected by the transmission
frequency, geographic location, atmospheric conditions, etc. In wireless settings
multi-path propagation effects also tend to have a sizable impact on channel fading.
Now generally, there are two key types of fading studied in wireless networks, i.e.,
fast and slow fading. Specifically, these delineations are made based upon the rate at
which the fading effects occur, i.e., changes in amplitude and/or phase of transmitted
signal. Here fast fading involves amplitude and phase changes on timescales below
the delay constraint, i.e., of the channel. In addition there are also two further types
of fast fading, flat fading and frequency-selective fading. In the former, all frequency
components of a signal experience the same fading behavior, whereas in the latter the
fading levels vary across different frequency components of the transmitted signal.
As fading is a key impairment concern, this chapter focuses on PU/SU modeling
for fast-flat fading channels (whereas Chapter 4 looks at the case of slow-flat fading
channels). In particular, the Rayleigh fast-flat fading model is treated first and
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appropriate utility functions defined. The existence and uniqueness of the NE for
the modified game are then shown and simulation analysis conducted. The process is
then repeated for the Rician fast-flat fading channel and overall conclusions drawn.

3.1

Rayleigh Fast-Flat Fading Channels

Consider some further details of a Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels as introduced in
Section 2.1.1. Here, the path fading coefficient αi is modeled as a Rayleigh random
variable with pdf given in Eq. (2.8), and the k-th moment of αi for n degrees of
freedom can be determined as [46]:
E[αik ]

Γ[ 12 (n + k)]
= (2σ )
Γ[ 12 n]
2

k
2

(3.1)

where Γ(.) is the Gamma function. Now the expectation of αi2 can be evaluated by
averaging αi2 multiplied by Eq. (2.8) over αi or by setting n = 2 in Eq. (3.1), given
2σ 2 . Here σ 2 = E[(αi2 )]/2 is the measure of the distribution’s spread and is further
assumed to be 1/2 for the rest of this dissertation. Furthermore, for a given Ii , the
expected value of γi (s) given in Eq. (2.16) equals Ai E[(αi2 )] = Ai . Hence by using
Eqs. (2.16) and (2.8), and by making a change of variable, the conditional pdf of
γi (s) given Ii is defined as follows:
(s)

pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) /Ii ) =

1 − γAi
e i
Ai

(3.2)

Moreover, by taking the average of P̃b (e) given in Eq. (2.17) with respect to
pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) /Ii ) shown in Eq. (3.2), the conditioned bit error probability, termed as
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P̃e , can be derived as follows [47]:
∞

Z

P̃b (e)pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) /Ii ) dγi (s)

P̃e = E[P̃b (e)] =
1
)
=(
2Ai

Z0

∞

−( 12 + A1 )αi

e

i

dαi =

0

1
(Ai + 2)

(3.3)

Now since Pe does not depend upon m, the bit index m can be dropped. Furthermore,
assuming P̃e ≈ 1/Ai for large SINR values, Pe can be determined by taking the
expectation of the approximation of Eq. (3.3) as follows [3], [4]:
E[Ii ] + σn2
Pe = E[P̃e ] = E[1/Ai ] =
h2si pi

(3.4)

Hence, by using Eq. (2.15) and assuming σ 2 = 1/2, Eq. (3.4) can be simplified and
rewritten as [3], [4]:
PN
Pe =
(Ra)

where γ̄i

3.1.1

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
h2si pi

=

1
(Ra)

(3.5)

γ̄i

is the average SINR for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels.

Utility Functions

As detailed before, a SU’s transmission is considered as interference to the PU.
Hence, the SUs should minimize their transmission powers in order to achieve the
best transmission quality. Thus a suitable utility function for the i-th SU has been
given in [7] and [27] for the case of AWGN channels. To further adapt this average
utility function to fit the proposed realistic channel model, some additional changes
are needed. Namely, P̃b (e), which is defined in Eq. (2.17), and was also used in the
utility function of [27], must be replaced with Pe which is defined in Eq. (3.5). Hence
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the modified utility function of the SUs is written as follows:
(Ra) M

Ri (1 − 2Pe )M
Ri (1 − 2/γ̄i
ui (pi , p−i ) =
=
pi
pi

)

(3.6)

where p−i denotes the action vector excluding the action of the i-th user, for i =
0, 1, . . . , N , and Ri is the transmission rate of the i-th SU.
Now the utility function in Eq.

(3.6) quantifies the number of successfully
(Ra)

transmitted bits per unit transmission power. In addition Pc = (1−2Pe )M = f (γ̄i

)

represents the probability of correct reception of packets at the receiver, where f (.)
is the efficiency function. Hence Pc is basically a function of the average SINR and
in this dissertation it is assumed that the approximation of this value is consistent
with the AWGN game in [7], see [27] for justification.
Overall the utility function for the PU is given as follows [7]:
u0 (Q0 , p−0 ) = Q0 −µ1 [(Q0 −I0 )2 u(Q0 −I0 )]−µ2 [(e(I0 −Q0 ) −1)u(I0 −Q0 )] (3.7)
where µ1 and µ2 are positive pricing coefficients and u(.) is the step function.

In general, one can interpret the PU utility as being proportional to the payments
the SUs need to make for using its spectrum. Hence Eq. (3.7) shows that if SUs
can better manage their transmitted powers, they will reduce the total interference
caused to the PU. Thus, the PU’s utility is proportional to the amount of interference
that the PU is willing to tolerate from all SUs. As a result the new modified noncooperative game for the proposed realistic Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels, G1 =
(N , P, ui (.)), has the following three components:
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1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where 0-th user is taken to be the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th SU.
2) Action space: P = (Q × P1 × P2 × . . . × PN ), where Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents
the PU’s action set and Pi = [pi(min) , pi(max) ] represents the i-th SU’s action set. In
particular, Q̄0 represents the maximum allowed interference cap of the PU, and pi(min)
and pi(max) respectively, represent the minimum and maximum allowed transmission
power of the i-th SU. The action vector of all users is denoted by p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ],
where pi ∈ Pi and Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . The PU’s strategy is to choose the
best Q0 at any given time, while that of SUs is to adapt their transmit powers.
3) Utility functions: In this game ui (pi , p−i ), given in Eq. (3.6), is used to represent
the i-th SU’s utility function for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. In addition
u0 (Q0 , p−0 ), which is given in Eq. (3.7), is used to represent the utility function of
the PU.

3.1.2

Existence of a Nash Equilibrium

Assuming the secondary system employs a MF receiver, the action space defined in
[7] should be modified to guarantee the existence of a NE. Moreover, to show the
existence of at least one NE point, it is sufficient to show that the utility function is
concave in pi . Now since the quasi-concavity of the PU’s utility function has been
proven in [7], one only needs to show the quasi-concavity and the continuity of the
(Ra)

(Ra)

utility function of the SUs. Hence from Eq. (3.5) it is easy to show that

∂γ̄i
∂pi

=

γ̄i
pi

.

By taking the first derivative of Eq. (3.6) one can also get:
Ri
2(M + 1)
∂ui (pi , p−i )
2
− 1)
= 2 (1 − (Ra) )M −1 (
(Ra)
∂pi
pi
γ̄i
γ̄i
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(Ra)

Furthermore, by setting the above expression to zero, it is seen that γ̄i

= 2(M +1),

which can be further simplified using Eq. (3.5) to [3]:
PN

j=1
j6=i

pmax
= 2(M + 1)
i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
(3.9)

h2si

where pmax
is the maximum level of transmit power within the convex action space
i
Pi . Moreover the second derivative of Eq. (3.6) is given as follows:
2
M
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
Ri (1 − γ̄i(Ra) )
(Ra)
(Ra)
= 3 (Ra)
(4M 2 +12M +8+2(γ̄i )2 −8(M +1)γ̄i ) (3.10)
2
∂pi 2
pi (γ̄i
− 2)

Hence, the utility function ui (pi , p−i ) is concave if:
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
(Ra)
(Ra)
(Ra)
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
< 0, ∀γ̄i
2
∂pi

(3.11)

p
(Ra)
(Ra)
where γ̄i(max) = 2(M + 1) + 2(M 2 + M ) is the maximum average SINR and γ̄i(min) =
p
2(M + 1) − 2(M 2 + M ) is the minimum average SINR for the Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channels. Thus in order to guarantee that the utility function is concave,
the action space in [7] should be modified for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels as
follows [3]:
(Ra)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

(Ra)

(Ra)

∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )}

(3.12)

As such the utility functions of both the PU and SUs satisfy all the required conditions for the existence of at least one NE in this game. The uniqueness of this NE is
shown next.
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3.1.3

Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium

To test the uniqueness of the NE, ri∗ (p−i ) is assumed to be the best-response function
of player i [37]. Now the best-response vector over all SUs is denoted by r1 (p) =
∗
is the
, pi(max) ) and pmax
(p−N )), where ri∗ (p−i ) = min (pmax
(r1∗ (p−1 ), r2∗ (p−2 ), . . . , rN
i
i
(Ra)∗

i-th SU’s transmission power which provides it with the optimum SINR (i.e., γ̄i

).

Since it is also assumed that all SUs have the same efficiency function, this implies
that the SINR corresponding to the best-response is the same for all SUs, i.e., ri∗ (pi )
(Ra)∗

= ri∗ (p−i ). Hence when some of the SUs cannot achieve γ̄i

, they will send at

their maximum possible transmit power and in this case the NE is still unique.
Now in [37] it was shown that if the best-response of the PU and SUs are standard
functions, then the NE in the game will be unique. Specifically, a function r(p) is
said to be a standard function if it satisfies the following properties:
1) Positivity: r(p) > 0.
0

0

2) Monotonicity: If p ≥ p , then r(p) ≥ r(p ).
3) Scalability: For all µ > 1, µr(p) > r(µp).

Hence, the best-response correspondence of the SUs in the game can be obtained
0

by setting ui (pi , p−i ) to zero which leads to Eq. (3.9) where pmax
= ri∗ (p−i ).
i
Now earlier in [7] it has been shown that the best-response function of the PU
is standard and equals r0∗ (p−0 ) =

1
2µ1

+ I0 . As a result one just needs to prove that

the best-response function of the SUs is standard by checking the above-detailed
three properties. Foremost, the power action sets of the PU and the SUs are closed
subsets of R. Furthermore it is easy to check that the utility functions of the PU and
the SUs are continuous in p. Also by examining Eq. (3.9), it is easy to check the
0

0

monotonicity of r(p) by showing that pmax
(p) > pmax
(p ) for all i if p > p . Finally,
i
i
to prove scalability, one must show that pmax
(pi ) is scalable. This can be done by
i

34

Chapter 3. Fast-Flat Fading Channels Model

rewriting Eq. (3.9) as follows:
PN
(pi ) = 2(M + 1)
pmax
i

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
(3.13)

h2si
P
2 2
2 2
2
µ( N
j=1 hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 ) + σn
j6=i

pmax
(µpi ) = 2(M + 1)
i

h2si

(3.14)

while
PN

j=1
j6=i

µpmax
(pi ) = 2µ(M + 1)
i
From Eqs.

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
h2si

(3.15)

(3.14) and (3.15) it is obvious that µpmax
(pi ) > pmax
(µpi ), which
i
i

completes NE uniqueness proof for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels model.

3.1.4

Analysis of Simulation Results

Detailed simulations are done to model the performance of the game theoretic scheme.
In particular, the following parameters are used: Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1,
hpi = hip = hji = 1 for all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, M = 80, Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1,
µ1 = 10 and µ2 = 100. First of all, the PU utility at the NE is shown as a function
of the number of SUs N in Figure 3.1. Here it is seen that when Q̄0 < I0 , the PU’s
utility is severely penalized by the exponential pricing function. This occurs when
N ≥ 26 for AWGN channel and when N ≥ 17 for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels.
Meanwhile Figure 3.2 plots I0 values from all SUs to the PU. Here when N > 3 for
AWGN channel case, the network cannot support these SUs, and as a result, no SU
can achieve its optimal SINR. Thus all SUs are forced to transmit at their maximum
power levels, and both the PU’s utility at the NE and I0 increase linearly with N .
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Figure 3.1: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading

Figure 3.2: Total interference from all secondary users for Rayleigh fast fading
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Next, the average SU utility is also shown in Figure 3.3. Here as the number of
SUs increases, each SU (as well as the PU) sees more interference due to the added
numbers of SUs. Thus each SU has to transmit at a higher power than that with
smaller numbers of SUs in the system in order to achieve the same optimum SINR.
This reduces the average utility. Figure 3.4 also plots the number of SU’s in energy
efficient mode. Hence one sees that all SUs will maximize their utility by achieving
(Ra)∗

their optimum SINR, i.e., γ̄i∗ and γ̄i

, when 0 < N ≤ 1 for Rayleigh fast-flat fading

channels and when 0 < N ≤ 3 for AWGN channels. Otherwise, the network cannot
afford these SUs, i.e., no SU can achieve its optimum SINR. In this case all SUs
transmit at their maximum possible power levels, which equals P̄i = 20 for AWGN
(max)

channels and Pi

for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels.

Finally, Figure 3.5 shows the number of SUs that the PU can afford as a function
of the total number of SUs. This could be any number of SUs as long as Q̄0 > I0 ,
where N = 25 for AWGN channel and N = 17 for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels.
As expected, the total number of SUs that the PU can afford is lower in the case
of Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. In addition, Figure 3.6 shows the aggregate
utility achieved by all SUs at the NE. These results show that the sum of all SUs’
utility has a unique maximum when N = 4 for AWGN channel and when N = 6
for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. As the number of SUs increases, average SU
utility decreases. Also when N < 4 for AWGN channel and N < 6 for Rayleigh
fast-flat fading channels, the decrease in the average SU utility is dominated by
the increase of the number of SUs, and hence the aggregate utility of all SUs still
increases. Conversely, the aggregate utility decreases due to the decay of the average
SU utility.
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Figure 3.3: Average secondary user’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading

Figure 3.4: Number of SUs in energy-efficient mode for Rayleigh fast fading
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Figure 3.5: The maximum number of SUs that can be supported for Rayleigh fast fading

Figure 3.6: Sum of secondary users’ utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading
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3.2

Rician Fast-Flat Fading Channels

The Rician channel is another popular fast-flat fading channel model. In general the
performance of wireless telecommunication systems under this channel is better than
that with Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. This is attributed to the existence of
the LOS component, i.e., stronger received signal. Along these lines, consider the
derivation of the bit error probability, Pe , for Rician fast-flat fading channels. First,
the path fading coefficient αi is modeled as a random variable with Rician pdf given
by Eq. (2.9). Here (αi /σ)2 has a non-central chi-square distribution with two degrees
of freedom and non-centrality parameter (s/σ)2 . Furthermore, the Rician K-factor,
i.e., 0.5(s/σ)2 , is defined as the ratio of signal power in dominant component over
the (local-mean) scattered power.

Assuming σ 2 = 1/2, and using Eqs. (2.16) and (2.9) with a change of variable,
the conditional pdf of γi (s) given Ii is defined as follows [4]:
2

pγi (s) /Ii (γi

(s)

(s)

e−s −( γAi )
i I (2s
e
/Ii ) =
0
Ai

q
γi (s) /Ai )

(3.16)

Furthermore, taking the average of P̃b (e) with respect to pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) /Ii ), the conditioned bit error probability, (P̃e ), in Eq. (2.17) can be derived as follows [4], [47]:
Z

∞

(s)

P̃e = E[P̃b (e)] =
P̃b (e)pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) /Ii ) dγi
0
q
−s2 Z ∞
(s)
e
−( 1 + 1 )γ
(s)
=
e 2 Ai i I0 (2s γi (s) /Ai ) dγi
2Ai 0

(3.17)

Using the following expansion of the zero-order modified first-kind Bessel function
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[46]:

I0 (x) =

∞
X
( x )2k
2

k=0

(3.18)

(k!)2

Eq. (3.17) can be further simplified as follows:

P̃e =

2 Z
∞
X
e−s

k=0

2Ai

∞

(s

p

0

γi (s) /Ai )2k −( 12 + A1 )γi(s) (s)
i
dγi
e
(k!)2

(3.19)

R∞
2
Moreover, using the fact that 0 x(2k+1) e−ax dx = k!/2a(k+1) and the exponential
P
k
expansion ex = ∞
k=0 x /k!, the above equation can be simplified to:
P̃e =

−Ai
1
s2 (
)
e Ai +2
Ai + 2

(3.20)

2

finally, assuming P̃e ≈ e−s /Ai for large SINR, Pe can be found by taking the
expectation of the approximation of Eq. (3.20) as follows:
2

Pe = E[P̃e ] ≈ E[1/Ai ]e−s =

E[Ii ] + σn2 −s2
e
h2si pi

(3.21)

where the expectation of Ii is defined as [4]:

E[Ii ] =

N
X

h2sj ρ2ji pj E[αj2 ] + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 E[α02 ]

(3.22)

j=1
j6=i

Carefully note that the bit index m is dropped here since Pe does not depend upon
m. Furthermore, the k-th moment of αj for n degrees of freedom can be found using
[46] as:
k

s2

E[αjk ] = (2σ 2 ) 2 e−( 2σ2 )

Γ[ 12 (n + k)]
n + k n s2
F
(
, ; 2)
1
1
2
2 2σ
Γ[ 12 n]
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where 1 F1 (a, b; c) is the confluent hypergeometric function and Γ(.) is the Gamma
function. Hence for n = 2 and assuming σ 2 = 1/2, Eq. (3.23) can be rewritten as:
E[αj2 ] = e−s

2

Γ[2]
2
1 F1 (2, 1; s ), j = 0, 1, . . . , N
Γ[1]

(3.24)

Again, using exponential expansion and the fact that [46]:

1 F1 (α, β; x) =

∞
X
Γ(α + k)Γ(β)xk
k=0

Γ(α)Γ(β + k)k!

, β 6= 0, −1, ..

(3.25)

hence, one can rewrite Eq. (3.24) as:

E[αj2 ]

=e

−s2

(

∞
X
Γ(2 + k)Γ(1)s2k
k=0

Γ(2)Γ(1 + k)k!

)=e

−s2

(

∞
X
k(s)2k
k=0

k!

+

∞
X
(s)2k
k=0

k!

) j = 0, 1, . . . , N
(3.26)

After some manipulation, the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
E[αj2 ] = s2 + 1, j = 0, 1, . . . , N

(3.27)

Furthermore, using Eqs. (3.22) and (3.27) one can simplify (3.21) to [4]:
P
2 2
2 2
2
2
( N
j=1, hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 )(s + 1) + σn
Pe ≈
(Rice)

where γ̄i

3.2.1

j6=i

h2si pi es2

≈

1
(Rice)
γ̄i

(3.28)

is the average SINR for Rician fast-flat fading channels.

Utility Functions

SU transmissions in CR networks are generally considered as interference to the
PU. Hence SUs should maximize their transmission energy efficiency by using the
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smallest possible amount of transmission power to achieve the best transmission
quality. Along these lines, a suitable utility function for the i-th secondary user
has been given in [7] and [27]. However, to adapt this average utility function to
fit the proposed realistic Rician fast-flat fading channels model, some changes are
needed. Namely, P̃b (e) which is defined in Eq. (2.17) and was used to define the
utility function in [7] and [27], must be replaced with Pe which is defined in Eq.
(3.28) for Rician fast-flat fading channels. Hence one can get [4], [48]:
(Rice) M

ui (pi , p−i ) =

Ri (1 − 2/γ̄i
Ri (1 − 2Pe )M
=
pi
pi

)

(3.29)

where Ri is the transmission rate of the i-th SU and p−i denotes the action vector
excluding the action of the i-th user, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N .

In general the utility function in Eq. (3.29) quantifies the number of successfully
transmitted bits per unit transmission power. Furthermore, in order to be consistent
with the AWGN games in [7] and [27], the probability of correct reception of packets
at the receiver, Pc , which is a function of the average SINR, is defined as Pc =
(Rice)

(1 − 2Pe )M = f (γ̄i

), where f (.) is the efficiency function, see [27]. Now the

utility function for the PU remains the same as that given in Eq. (3.7). Overall, the
PU’s utility can be interpreted as being proportion to the payments the SUs need to
make for using its spectrum. In other words, the PU’s utility is proportional to the
amount of interference that the PU is willing to tolerate from all SUs. Hence, the
new modified non-cooperative game for the proposed realistic Rician fast-flat fading
channels, G2 = (N , P, ui (.)), has the following components:
1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where 0-th user represents the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th SU.
2) Action space: P = (Q × P1 × P2 × . . . × PN ), where Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents the
PU’s action set and Pi = [pi(min) , pi(max) ] represents the i-th SU’s action set. Here
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Q̄0 represents the maximum allowed Q0 of the PU, and pi(min) and pi(max) represent
the minimum and maximum allowed transmission power of the i-th SU respectively.
The action vector of all users is denoted by p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ], where pi ∈ Pi and
Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . It is important to note that PU’s strategy is to choose
the best Q0 at any given time, while that of SUs is to adapt their transmit powers.
3) Utility functions: In this game ui (pi , p−i ), given in Eq. (3.29) is used to
represent the i-th SU’s utility function for Rician fast-flat fading channels. Meanwhile
u0 (Q0 , p−0 ), given in Eq. (3.7), is used to represent utility function the PU.

3.2.2

Existence of a Nash Equilibrium

Again, assuming a MF receiver is employed at the SU systems, the action space
defined in [7] must be modified to guarantee the existence of NE for realistic Rician
fast-flat fading channels. Hence the steps to show the existence and uniqueness of the
NE for Rician fast-flat fading channels are now presented. To prove the existence of
a NE point, it is again sufficient to show that the all utility functions are concave in
pi . Now given that the quasi-concavity of the PU’s utility function has been proven
in [7], the only thing that needs to be shown here is the quasi-concavity and the
continuity of the utility functions of the SUs. Hence from Eq. (3.28), it is easy to
(Rice)

(Rice)

show that

∂γ̄i
∂pi

=

γ̄i

pi

. Moreover by taking the first derivative of Eq. (3.29) one

gets [4], [48]:
Ri
2(M + 1)
∂ui (pi , p−i )
2
= 2 (1 − (Rice) )M −1 ( (Rice) − 1)
∂pi
pi
γ̄i
γ̄i
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(Rice)

By setting the above expression to zero, it is seen that γ̄i

= 2(M + 1), which can

be further simplified using Eq. (3.28) to:
P
2 2
2 2
2
2
( N
j=1 hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 )(s + 1) + σn
pmax
= 2(M + 1)
i

j6=i

(3.31)

h2si es2

where pmax
is the maximum level of transmit power within the convex action space
i
Pi . Furthermore the second derivative of Eq. (3.29) is given as follows:
2
M
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
Ri (1 − γ̄i(Rice) )
(Rice) 2
(Rice)
= 3 (Rice)
(4M 2 +12M +8+2(γ̄i
) −8(M +1)γ̄i
) (3.32)
2
∂pi 2
pi (γ̄i
− 2)

Hence the utility function ui (pi , p−i ) is concave if:
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
(Rice)
(Rice)
(Rice)
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
< 0, ∀γ̄i
2
∂pi

(3.33)

p
(Rice)
(Rice)
where γ̄i(max) = 2(M + 1) + 2(M 2 + M ) is the maximum average SINR and γ̄i(min) =
p
2(M + 1) − 2(M 2 + M ) is the minimum average SINR for the Rician fast-flat
fading channels. Based upon the above, the action space in [7] must be modified to
fit Rician fast-flat fading channels as follows [4], [48]:
(Rice)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

(Rice)

(Rice)

∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )}

(3.34)

This modification will guarantee that the utility function is concave. As such the
utility functions of both the PU and SUs satisfy all the required conditions for the
existence of at least one NE in this game. The uniqueness of this NE is now shown.
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3.2.3

Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium

The best-response function of player i, ri∗ (p−i ), is used to test the uniqueness of
the NE

[37]. Now the best-response vector over all SUs is given by r2 (p) =

∗
is the
, pi(max) ) and pmax
(p−N )), where ri∗ (p−i ) = min (pmax
(r1∗ (p−1 ), r2∗ (p−2 ), . . . , rN
i
i
(Rice)∗

i-th SU’s transmission power which gives it the optimum SINR (γ̄i

) for Rician

fast-flat fading channels. Since it is assumed that all SUs have the same efficiency
function, this also implies that the SINR corresponding to the best-response is the
same for all SUs, i.e., ri∗ (pi ) = ri∗ (p−i ). Hence when some of the SUs cannot achieve
their optimum SINR, they will send at their maximum possible transmit power levels
and the NE is still unique in this case. Moreover it has been shown in [37] that
if the best-response of the PU and SUs are standard functions, then the NE in the
game will be unique. Now consider the same conditions for positivity, monotonicity
and scalability noted in Section 3.2.3. Hence the best-response correspondence of
0

the SUs in our game can be obtained by setting ui (pi , p−i ) to zero, which leads to
= ri∗ (p−i ).
Eq. (3.31) for Rician fast-flat fading channels, where pmax
i

As indicated earlier, the best-response function of the PU has been shown to be
standard and equals r0∗ (p−0 ) =

1
2µ1

+ I0 . Hence one just needs to prove that the

best-response function of the SUs is also standard by checking the three properties
listed in Section 3.2.3. Foremost, the power action sets of the PU and the SUs are
closed subsets of R. Furthermore, it is easy to check that the utility functions of
the PU and the SUs are continuous in p. Also by examining Eq. (3.31), it is easy
0

to check the monotonicity of r(p) by showing that pmax
(p) > pmax
(p ) for all i if
i
i
0

p > p . Finally, to prove scalability, one must show that pmax
(pi ) is scalable. This
i
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can be achieved by rewriting Eq. (3.31) as follows:
P
2
2
2 2
2 2
( N
j=1, hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 )(s + 1) + σn
j6=i

(p−i ) = 2(M + 1)
pmax
i
µ((

h2si
PN

(µp−i ) = 2(M + 1)
pmax
i

j=1,
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 )(s2 + 1)) + σn2
h2si
(3.35)

while
P
2 2
2 2
2
2
( N
j=1, hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 )(s + 1) + σn
µpmax
(p−i ) = 2µ(M + 1)
i

j6=i

h2si

(3.36)

(µp−i ), which
(p−i ) > pmax
From Eqs. (3.35) and (3.36) it is obvious that µpmax
i
i
completes NE uniqueness proof for the case of Rician fast-flat fading channels model.

3.2.4

Analysis and Simulation Results

To model the performance of the proposed game theoretic scheme, detailed simulations are done. Results with the earlier-developed Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels
(Section 3.2.4) are also included for comparison purposes. Again, the following
parameters are used: Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1, hpi = hip = hji = 1 for
all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, M = 80, Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1, µ1 = 10 and µ2 = 100.
First of all, the PU utility at the NE is shown as a function of the number of SUs, N ,
in Figure 3.7. Here it is seen that when Q̄0 < I0 , the PU’s utility is severely penalized
by the exponential pricing function. This happens when N ≥ 26 for AWGN channel,
N ≥ 17, and N ≥ 14 for Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels, respectively.
Meanwhile, Figure 3.8 shows the total interference, I0 , from all SUs to the PU. Here
when N > 3 for AWGN channel case, the network cannot support these SUs, and as
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a result no SU can achieve its optimal SINR. Hence all SUs are forced to transmit at
their maximum possible power levels, and I0 increases linearly with N . As a result
the PU’s utility at the NE also increases linearly. Moreover, when N ≥ 9 for both
fast-flat fading channels, I0 is greater than that for AWGN channel and therefore
the PU’s utility (proportional to the total amount of interference) is also higher, as
shown in Figure 3.8.
Next, the average SU utility is plotted in Figure 3.9. Here as the number of SUs
increases, each SU as well as the PU, sees more interference due to the added SUs.
Therefore in order to achieve the same optimum SINR, each SU has to transmit at a
higher power than that with a smaller number of SUs, and this decreases the average
utility. Moreover the average utility in the case of fading is also lower than that for
AWGN channels, i.e., due to the interference introduced to the channel by fading.
For example, when N < 4 for AWGN channel, N < 9 for Rayleigh fast-flat fading
channels, and N < 5 for Rician fast-flat fading channels, the decrease in the average
SU utility is dominated by the increase of the number of SUs (Figure 3.9). Here the
aggregate utility of all SUs still increases. Conversely, the aggregate utility decreases
due to the decay of the average SU utility. Figure 3.10 also shows the number of SUs
in energy-efficient mode. Here when 0 < N ≤ 3 for AWGN channel, 0 < N ≤ 4, and
0 < N ≤ 1 for Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels, respectively, one sees
that all SUs maximize their utility by achieving their optimum SINR. Otherwise the
network cannot afford these SUs and hence no SU can achieve its optimum SINR.
Thus all SUs transmit at their maximum possible power level, which equals P̄i = 20
(max)

for AWGN channel and Pi

for the both fast-flat fading channels.
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Figure 3.7: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rician fast fading

Figure 3.8: Total interference from all secondary users for Rician fast fading
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Figure 3.9: Average secondary user’s utility at the NE for Rician fast fading

Figure 3.10: Number of SUs in energy-efficient mode for Rician fast fading
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Finally, Figure 3.11 plots the number of SUs, N , that the PU can afford as a
function of the total number of SUs. In general this can be any number of SUs as
long as Q̄0 > I0 , and from the plot we get N = 25 for AWGN, N = 17 for Rayleigh
fast-flat fading channels and N = 14 for Rician fast-flat fading channels. As expected,
the total number of SUs that the PU can afford is generally lower in fast-flat fading
channels. In addition, Figure 3.12 shows the aggregate utility achieved by all SUs at
the NE. These results show that the sum of all SUs’ utility has a unique maximum
when N = 4 for AWGN channel, N = 9, and N = 5 for Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat
fading channels, respectively. Also as the number of SUs increases, average SU utility
decreases.

Figure 3.11: The maximum number of SUs that can be supported for Rician fast fading
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Figure 3.12: Sum of secondary users’ utility at the NE for Rician fast fading

3.3

Conclusions

This chapter studies the impact of fast-flat fading on game-theoretic models for CR
networks. In particular, the average bit error rate, Pe , is derived for each bit in the
packet, and the average utility functions are then evaluated for both Rayleigh and
Rician fast-flat fading channels. In these models the path fading coefficient cannot be
assumed as constant over the packet duration, albeit it can be over the bit duration.
Detailed analytical derivations are performed to show that the modified realistic game
can achieve a unique NE point, assuming MF detectors are used at the secondary
systems. Overall, the simulations show that the proposed scheme yields realistic
energy efficiency for SUs without compromising transmission quality for PUs. The
results are also compared with more basic AWGN models. Overall, both Rayleigh
and Rician fast-flat fading channels are seen to have a very direct impact upon the
performance of the scheme, e.g., in terms of reduced numbers of users supported by
the PU (due to higher interference) and lower throughput-per-unit-power (utility).
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Building upon the work in Chapter 2, the impact of slow-flat fading channels on
PU/SU behaviors is now considered. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the amplitudes
of the fading coefficient in these type of channels have slower rate of changes as
compared to fast-flat fading channels. Hence the fading parameter αi is assumed to
change independently for each packet. Herein, both Rayleigh and Rician slow-flat
fading channels are considered.

4.1

Rayleigh Slow-Flat Fading Channels

Unlike fast-flat fading channels, the fading coefficient parameters αi and αj in slowflat fading channels are assumed to be independent for j 6= i. Moreover, in this work
the path fading coefficient of the i-th user, αi , is modeled for both Rayleigh and
Rician random variables. Now consider the derivation of Pe . Here path fading coefficient of the i-th user, αi , is modeled as a Rayleigh random variable. Furthermore,
given P̃b (e) in Eq. (2.17) the average correct packet reception, Pc , for M bits in each
packet is given by E[(1 − P̃b (e))M ], where the expectation is taken with respect to
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(s)

the random variables γi

and Ii . Thus the utility function of the SUs can be written

as [49]:
(s)

(s)

ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) =

f (γi )
Ri Pc
=
pi
pi

(4.1)

where Ri is the transmission rate of the i-th SU, p−i denotes the action vector
(s)

excluding the action of the i-th user, and f (γi ) represents the probability of correct
reception of packets at the receiver, where f (.) is the efficiency function. Moreover,
it is also assumed that Pc = (1 − 2Pe )M , which is consistent with the AWGN game
in [7], i.e., ui (pi , p−i /αi , Ii ) → 0 as pi → ∞ and ui (pi , p−i /αi , Ii ) → 0 as pi → 0,
see [27] for justification. Therefore by using Eq. (2.17) one can rewrite the above
equation as:
Ri (1 − e−
Ri (1 − 2P̃b (e))M
(s)
=
ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) =
pi
pi

(s)
γ
i
2

)M

(4.2)

The above utility function quantifies the number of information bits received successfully at the receiver per joule of expended energy. In other words, it quantifies the
number of successfully transmitted bits per unit transmission power. Furthermore,
(s)

(s)

taking the average of ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) in Eq. (4.2) with respect to pγi (s) /Ii (γi ), one
can get [49]:

(s)

ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) = E[ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii )]
∞

Z

(s)

(s)

ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) × pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) )dγi

=
0

Z
=
0

∞

Ri (1 − e−
(
pi

(s)
γ
i
2

)M

(s)

1 − γi
(s)
) × ( e Ai ) dγi
Ai
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Using the fact that (1 − e

(s)
γ
− i2


)

M

=

PM

n=0

M



n


 (−1)n e

(s)
−nγ
i
2

, the above equation

can be rewritten as follows:
Ri
ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) =
p i Ai

M
X




n=0

M
n


n

Z

∞

 (−1)

(s)

e

− A1 )γi
(− n
2
i

(s)

dγi

(4.4)

0

Furthermore, one can easily check that the integral in the above equation equals
(2Ai )/(nAi + 2). Thus


M
X
M
Ri
2

 (−1)n
ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) =
pi n=0
nAi + 2
n

(4.5)

Moreover, one can approximate Eq. (4.5) for large Ai as follows:


M
X
M
Ri
 (−1)n 2

ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) ≈
pi n=0
nAi
n


M
X
M
Ri
 (−1)n 2 }

≈
{1 +
pi
nAi
n
n=1

(4.6)

which also can be rewritten as [49]:
ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) ≈

where ψ = −

PM

n=1



M
n

Ri
ψ
(1 − )
pi
Ai

(4.7)


 (−1)n ( 2 ) > 0.
n

Next, averaging the above equation with respect to Ii , i.e., E[ui (pi , p−i /Ii )], one
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gets the i-th user’s average utility function for high SINR as follows [47], [49]:

M
X



M



Ri

 (−1)n 2 }
E{1 +
pi
nAi
n
n=1


M
X
M
Ri
2

 (−1)n
=
{1 +
}
pi
n
×
E[A
]
i
n
n=1


M
2
X
M
Ri

 (−1)n 2 × E[Ii ] + σn }
=
{1 +
pi
n
h2si pi
n
n=1

ui (pi , p−i ) ≈

(4.8)

Recall from Eq. (3.4) that E[1/Ai ] = (E[Ii ] + σn2 )/(h2si pi ) [3],[4]. Hence the above
equation can be rewritten as follows [49]:

ui (pi , p−i ) ≈

ψ
Ri
{1 − (Ra) }
pi
γ̄i

(4.9)

Note that the same utility function for the PU which was defined in Eq. (3.7) for
Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels case can also be reused here [3],[4].

4.1.1

Realistic Game

In general, SUs’ transmissions in the CR networks are considered as interference to
the PU. Hence, SUs should minimize the amount of transmission power to achieve
the best transmission quality. Thus in Eq. (4.2) a suitable utility function for the
i-th SU has been given as in [27]. To adapt the average utility function to fit our
model, some modifications must be added, as shown in Eq. (4.9). Therefore, the new
modified non-cooperative game for the proposed realistic Rayleigh slow-flat fading
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channels, G3 = (N , P, ui (.)), has the following components:
1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where 0-th user represents the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th SU.
2) Action space: P = (Q × P1 × P2 × . . . × PN ), where Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents the
PU’s action set and Pi = [pi(min) , pi(max) ] represents the i-th SU’s action set. Here Q̄0
represents the maximum allowed interference cap of the PU, and pi(min) and pi(max)
respectively, represent the minimum and maximum allowed transmission power of
the i-th SU. The action vector of all users is denoted by p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ], where
pi ∈ Pi and Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . The PU’s strategy is to choose the best Q0
at any given time, while that of SUs is to adapt their transmit powers.
3) Utility functions: In realistic game, the i-th SU’s average utility function,
ui (pi , p−i ), is given in Eq. (4.9) while u0 (Q0 , p−0 ) which is given in Eq. (3.7)
represents the utility function of the PU.

4.1.2

Existence of a Nash Equilibrium

Assuming a MF receiver is employed in the secondary system, the realistic action
space for AWGN channel should be modified to guarantee the existence of a NE for
Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels. Now given that the quasi-concavity of the PU’s
utility function has been proven in [7], one only needs to show the quasi-concavity and
the continuity of the average utility function of the SUs in pi to prove the existence
of at least one NE point. Hence taking the first derivative of ui (pi , p−i ) with respect
to pi gives:
Ri
∂ui (pi , p−i )
2ψ
= 2 (−1 + (Ra) )
∂pi
pi
γ̄i
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(Ra)

By setting the above expression to zero, it is seen that γ̄i

= 2ψ which can be

further simplified using Eq. (3.5) to [49]:
PN

j=1
j6=i

pmax
= 2ψ
i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
(4.11)

h2si

where pmax
is the maximum level of transmit power within the convex action space
i
Pi . Furthermore, the second derivative of ui (pi , p−i ) with respect to pi is given as
follows:

∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
2Ri
3ψ
= 3 (1 − (Ra) )
2
∂pi
pi
γ̄i

(4.12)

Hence, the utility function ui (pi , p−i ) is concave if:
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
(Ra)
(Ra)
(Ra)
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
< 0, ∀γ̄i
2
∂pi
(Ra)

(4.13)

(Ra)

where γ̄i(max) = 3ψ and γ̄i(min) = 1 are the maximum and minimum average SINR
for the Rayleigh slow flat fading channel respectively. Thus in order to guarantee
that the utility function is concave, the AWGN action space should be modified to
fit the Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels as follows [49]:
(Ra)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

(Ra)

(Ra)

∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )}

(4.14)

Therefore the PU’s utility function and SUs average utility function satisfy all the
required conditions for the existence of at least one NE in this game. The uniqueness
of this NE is shown next.
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4.1.3

Uniqueness of a the Nash Equilibrium

To test the uniqueness of the NE under Rayleigh slow-flat fading channel, ri∗ (p−i )
is assumed to be the best-response function of player i [37]. The best-response
∗
(p−N )), where ri∗ (p−i ) = min
vector over all SUs, r3 (p) = (r1∗ (p−1 ), r2∗ (p−2 ), . . . , rN
(max)

(pmax
, pi(max) ) and pi
i

is the i-th SU’s transmission power which provides it with
(Ra)∗

the optimum SINR (i.e., γ̄i

). Moreover, the SINR corresponding to the best-

response is the same for all SUs because all SUs are assumed to have the same
efficiency function. This implies that ri∗ (pi ) = ri∗ (p−i ). Hence when some of the
(Ra)∗

SUs cannot achieve γ̄i

, they will transmit at their maximum possible transmit

power and in this case the NE is still unique. Moreover, if the best-response of the
PU and SUs are standard functions, then the NE in the game will be unique. Now
consider the properties of a standard function as listed in Section 3.1.3. Here the
best-response correspondence of the SUs in our game can be obtained by setting
(max)

0

ui (pi , p−i ) to zero which leads to Eq. (4.11) where pi

= ri∗ (p−i ) [49].

Now earlier in [7] it has also been shown that the best-response function of the
PU is standard and equals r0∗ (p−0 ) =

1
2µ1

+ I0 . Hence one just needs to prove that

the best-response function of the SUs is standard by checking the three standard
function properties (Section 3.1.3). Foremost, the power action sets of the PU and
the SUs are closed subsets of R. Furthermore, it is easy to check that the utility
function of the PU and the average utility functions of SUs are continuous in p. Also
by examining Eq. (4.11), it is easy to check the monotonicity of r(p) by showing
0

0

that pmax
(p) > pmax
(p ) for all i if p > p . Finally, to prove scalability, it is enough
i
i
to show that pmax
(p−i ) is scalable. This can be achieved by rewriting Eq. (4.11) as
i
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follows [49]:
PN

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2

(p−i ) = 2ψ
pmax
i
h2si
P
2 2
2 2
2
µ( N
j=1 hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 ) + σn
j6
=
i
(µp−i ) = 2ψ
pmax
i
h2si

(4.15)

while
PN
µpmax
(p−i = (2µ)ψ
i

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 + σn2
h2si

(4.16)

From the above equations, it is obvious that µpmax
(p−i ) > pmax
(µp−i ), which comi
i
pletes NE uniqueness proof Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels.

4.1.4

Analysis of Simulation Results

Detailed simulations are also done to model the performance of the game theoretic
scheme under Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels. Again, the following parameters
are used: Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1, hpi = hip = hji = 1 for all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N
}, M = 50, Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1, µ1 = 10 and µ2 = 100. First of all, Figure 4.1
shows the PU utility at the NE as a function of the number of SUs N . One can see
that the PU’s utility is severely penalized by the exponential pricing function when
Q̄0 < I0 . This happens when N ≥ 26 for AWGN channel and when N ≥ 22 for
Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels. Meanwhile, the total interference from all SUs to
the PU is shown in Figure 4.2. When N > 3 for AWGN channel case, the network
cannot support these SUs, and as a result, no SU can achieve the optimal SINR.
Thus all SUs are forced to transmit at their maximum possible power levels, and
I0 increases linearly with N . As a result the PU’s utility at the NE also increases
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linearly.

Figure 4.1: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh slow fading
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Figure 4.2: Total interference from all secondary users for Rayleigh slow fading

Figure 4.3: Average secondary user’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh slow fading
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Next, the average SU utility is shown in Figure 4.3. Here as the number of
SUs increases, each SU and the PU sees more interference due to the added SUs.
Therefore each SU has to transmit at a higher power than that with smaller number
of SUs in the system in order to achieve the same optimum SINR. This reduces the
average utility. Moreover, the number of SU’s in energy efficient mode is plotted in
Figure 4.4. Here, when 0 < N ≤ 4 for AWGN channel and when 0 < N ≤ 3 for
Rayleigh slow-flat fading channel, one sees that all SUs will maximize their utility
(Ra)∗

by achieving their optimum SINR. i.e., γ̄i∗ and γ̄i

, respectively. Otherwise, the

network cannot afford these SUs (i.e., no SU can achieve its optimum SINR) and
they all transmit at their maximum possible power level, i.e., P̄i = 20 for AWGN
(max)

channel and Pi

for Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels.

Figure 4.4: Number of SUs in energy-efficient mode for Rayleigh slow fading
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Figure 4.5: The maximum number of SUs that can be supported for Rayleigh slow fading

Figure 4.6: Sum of SUs’ utility at the NE for Rayleigh slow fading
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Finally, Figure 4.5 shows the number of SUs that the PU can afford as a function
of the total number of SUs. This could be any number of SUs as long as Q̄0 > I0 ,
where N = 25 for AWGN channel and N = 22 for Rayleigh slow-fading channels.
As expected, the total number of SUs that the PU can afford is lower in the cases
of Rayleigh slow-flat fading channel. In addition, the sum of the utility achieved by
all SUs at the NE is shown in Figure 4.6. Results show that the sum of all SUs’
utility has a unique maximum when N = 6 for AWGN channel and when N = 4
for Rayleigh slow-fading channels. As the number of SUs increases, average SU
utility decreases. Also when N < 6 for AWGN channel and N < 4 for Rayleigh
slow-flat fading channels, the decrease in the average SU utility is dominated by
the increase of the number of SUs, and hence the aggregate utility of all SUs still
increases. Conversely, the aggregate utility decreases due to the decay of the average
SU utility. In general, one can see that the Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels have
a key direct impact upon the performance of the scheme, i.e., in terms of reduced
numbers SUs supported by the PU (due to higher interference) and lower utility as
compared to AWGN channel.
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4.2

Rician Slow-Flat Fading Channels

Consider the derivation of Pe for slow-flat fading channels. First, the path fading
coefficient αi is modeled as a random variable with Rician pdf. Furthermore, taking
(s)

(s)

the average of ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) in Eq. (4.2) with respect to pγi (s) /Ii (γi ), one gets
[50]:

(s)

ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) = E[ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii )]
Z

∞

(s)

(s)

ui (pi , p−i /γi , Ii ) × pγi (s) /Ii (γi (s) ) dγi

=

(4.17)

0

By making suitable substitutions, the above equation can be rewritten as follows
[50]:

Z
ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) =
0

∞

=

Ri e−s
p i Ai

2

γ

(s)
i
2

(s)
2
q
)M e−s −( γAi )
(s)
i
)
e
I0 (2s γi (s) /Ai ) dγi
Ai


Z ∞
M
X
(s)
M
(− n − 1 )γ
(s)
n

 (−1)
e 2 Ai i dγi(4.18)
0
n
n=0

Ri (1 − e−
(
pi

Next, using expansion of a zero-order modified first kind Bessel function which is
R∞
2
shown in Eq. (3.18), the fact that 0 x(2k+1) e−ax dx = k!/2a(k+1) , the exponential
(s)
γ
P∞ k
− i2 M
x
expansion
e
=
x
/k!
and
Binomial
series
expansion
(i.e.,
(1
−
e
) =
k=0


(s)
−nγ
M
PM

 e 2i (−1)n ), one can check to see that the integral in the above
n=0
n
equation equals (2Ai )e

s2 ( nA2+2 −1)
i

/(nAi + 2). Thus



M
s2 ( 2 −1)
X
M
Ri
2e nAi +2


ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) =
(−1)n
pi n=0
nA
+
2
i
n
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Moreover, Eq. (4.19) can be approximated for large Ai by:


M
s2 ( nA2+2 −1)
X
i
M
2Ri
2e


ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) ≈
(−1)n
pi n=0
nAi
n


M
−s2
X
M
Ri

 2e (−1)n }
≈
{1 +
pi
nAi
n
n=1

(4.20)

which also can be rewritten as [50]:
2

ui (pi , p−i /Ii ) ≈

where ψ = −

PM

n=1

M



Ri
ψe−s
(1 −
)
pi
Ai

(4.21)


 (−1)n ( 2 ) > 0. Next, averaging the above equation with
n

n
respect to Ii , i.e., E(ui (pi , p−i /Ii )), one gets the i-th user’s average utility function
for high SINR as follows [47], [50]:

M
X





−s2
M
Ri
n 2e


E{1 +
(−1)
}
ui (pi , p−i ) ≈
pi
nAi
n
n=1


2
M
X
M
Ri
2e−s
n


=
{1 +
(−1)
}
pi
n × E(Ai )
n
n=1


M
−s2
X M
Ri
E[Ii ] + σn2

 (−1)n 2e
=
{1 +
×
}
2
pi
n
h
p
i
si
n
n=1

ui (pi , p−i ) ≈

(Rice)

where E[1/Ai ] = (E[Ii ] + σn2 )/(h2si pi ) and γ̄i
flat fading channels [4].
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ψ
{1 − (Rice) }
pi
γ̄i

(4.22)

is the average SINR for Rician fast-
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4.2.1

Realistic Game

Overall, a suitable utility function for the i-th SU has been given as in [27]. However,
some modifications must be added to this utility function in order to adapt it to fit
the proposed model as shown in Eq. (4.22). Namely, the new non-cooperative game
for the proposed realistic Rician slow-flat fading channel, G4 = (N , P, ui (.)), has the
following components [50]:
1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where 0-th user represents the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th SU.
2) Action space: P = (Q × P1 × P2 × . . . × PN ), where Pi = [pi(min) , pi(max) ]
represents the i-th SU’s action set and Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents the PU’s action
set. Moreover, pi(min) and pi(max) represent the minimum and maximum allowed
transmission power of the i-th SU respectively, and Q̄0 represents the maximum
allowed interference cap of the PU. The action vector of all users is denoted by
p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ], where pi ∈ Pi and Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . Thus the
strategy of the PU’s is to choose the best Q0 all the time, while that of SUs is to
adapt their transmit powers.
3) Utility functions: In a realistic game the i-th SU’s average utility function is
given by ui (pi , p−i ) in Eq. (4.22). Meanwhile, u0 (Q0 , p−0 ), which is given in Eq.
(3.7), represents the utility function of the PU.

4.2.2

Existence of the Nash Equilibrium

Assuming that a MF receiver is used in the secondary system, the realistic action
space for AWGN channel must be modified to guarantee the existence of the NE
for a Rician slow-flat fading channel. Now the authors in [7] have proven the quasiconcavity of the PU’s utility function. Thus one only needs to show the quasi-
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concavity and the continuity of the average utility function of the SUs in pi , i.e., to
show that there exists at least one NE point. Hence by taking the first derivative of
ui (pi , p−i ) given in Eq. (4.22) with respect to pi , one gets:
Ri
2ψ
∂ui (pi , p−i )
= 2 (−1 + (Rice) )
∂pi
pi
γ̄i

(4.23)

(Rice)

By setting the above expression to zero, it is seen that γ̄i

= 2ψ. Moreover, by

using Eq. (3.28), Eq. (4.23) simplifies to [50]:
(

PN

pmax
= 2ψ
i

j=1
j6=i

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 )(s2 + 1) + σn2
h2si es2

(4.24)

where pmax
is the maximum level of transmit power within the convex action space
i
Pi . Moreover by taking the second derivative of ui (pi , p−i ) with respect to pi one
can get:
2Ri
3ψ
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
= 3 (1 − (Rice) )
2
∂pi
pi
γ̄i

(4.25)

Hence, the utility function ui (pi , p−i ) is concave if:
∂ 2 ui (pi , p−i )
(Rice)
(Rice)
(Rice)
< 0, ∀γ̄i
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
2
∂pi
(Rice)

(4.26)

(Rice)

where γ̄i(max) = 3ψ and γ̄i(min) = 1 are the maximum and minimum average SINR
for the Rician slow-flat fading channel, respectively. Thus in order to guarantee the
concavity of the utility function, the AWGN action space must be modified to fit the
Rician slow-flat fading channel as follows [50]:
(Rice)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

(Rice)

(Rice)

∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )}
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Therefore the average utility functions of PUs and SUs satisfy all the required
conditions for the existence of at least one NE in this game. The uniqueness of
this NE is shown next.

4.2.3

Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium

To test the uniqueness of the NE under the Rician slow-flat fading channel, ri∗ (p−i )
is assumed to be the best-response function of player i [37]. Also the best-response
∗
(p−N )), where ri∗ (p−i ) =
vector over all SUs is r4 (p) = (r1∗ (p−1 ), r2∗ (p−2 ), . . . , rN
(max)

min (pmax
, pi(max) ) and pi
i

is the i-th SU’s transmission power which provides it
(Rice)∗

with the optimum SINR (i.e., γ̄i

). Moreover, the SINR corresponding to the

best-response is the same for all SUs because all SUs are assumed to have the same
efficiency function. This implies that ri∗ (pi ) = ri∗ (p−i ). Hence some of the SUs will
(Rice)∗

send at their maximum possible transmit power when they cannot achieve γ̄i

and in this case the NE is still unique. Again, as shown in Section 3.2.3, if the
best-responses of the PU and SUs are standard functions, then the NE in the game
will be unique. Hence the best-response correspondence of the SUs in the proposed
0

game can be obtained by setting ui (pi , p−i ) to zero, which leads to Eq. (4.24) where
(max)

pi

= ri∗ (p−i ) [50]. Furthermore, the authors in [7] have also shown that the best-

response function of the PU is standard and equals r0∗ (p−0 ) =

1
2µ1

+ I0 . Therefore,

one only needs to prove that the best-response function of the SUs is standard by
checking the three properties above. By doing so, it is shown that the NE is unique.

4.2.4

Analysis of Simulation Results

In order to model the performance of the game theoretic scheme under realistic Rician
slow-flat fading channel model, detailed simulations are done in MATLAB using the
following parameters: Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1, hpi = hip = hji = 1 for all i ,
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j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, M = 50, Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1, µ1 = 10 and µ2 = 100. First of
all, Figure 4.7 shows the number of SUs that the PU can afford as a function of the
total number of SUs. This can be any number of SUs as long as Q̄0 > I0 , and results
show N = 25 for AWGN channel and N = 19 for Rician slow-flat fading channels.
Thus in the Rician slow-flat fading channels case, the PU can afford lower number
of SUs as compared to the AWGN channel case. However, the general performance
is better than that for the case of Rician fast-flat fading channel, i.e., N = 12.
Furthermore, Figure 4.8 plots the sum of the utility achieved by all SUs at the
NE. These results show that the sum of all SUs’ utility has a unique maximum when
N = 6 for AWGN channel and when N = 19 for Rician slow-flat fading channels.
Hence as the number of SUs increases, the average SU utility decreases. Also the
decrease in the average SU utility is dominated by the increase in the number of SUs,
and hence the total utility of all SUs still increases when N < 6 for AWGN channel
and N < 19 for Rician slow-flat fading channel. Conversely, the aggregate utility
decreases due to the decay of the average SU utility.
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Figure 4.7: The maximum number of SUs that can be supported for Rician slow fading

Figure 4.8: Sum of SUs’ utility at the NE for Rician slow fading
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Next, the average SU utility is shown in Figure 4.9. Here each SU and the PU
see more interference as the number of SUs increases due to the added SUs. Hence
the high interference generated from larger number of SUs in the system forces each
SU to transmit at higher power in order to achieve the same optimum SINR. This
reduces the average utility. Moreover, Figure 4.10 plots the total interference, I0 ,
from all SUs to the PU for AWGN channel and for both Rician slow-flat fading and
Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels. Here the Rician slow-flat fading channels have
superior performance as compared to Rayleigh slow-flat fading channels. Namely,
when N > 3 for AWGN channel case, the network cannot support these SUs, and as
a result, no SU can achieve the optimal SINR. Thus all SUs are forced to transmit at
their maximum possible power level and I0 increases linearly with N . As a result the
PU’s utility at the NE also increases linearly. The same is true for Rayleigh slow-flat
fading channels.
Finally, the utility of the PU at the NE is plotted in Figure 4.11 as a function of the
number of SUs, N , where the PU’s utility is severely penalized by the exponential
pricing function when Q̄0 < I0 . This happens when N ≥ 26 for AWGN channel,
when N ≥ 20 for Rician slow-flat fading channel and when N ≥ 12 for Rician
fast-flat fading channel. To conclude, Rician slow-flat fading channels have a direct
impact in terms of reducing the number of SUs that can be supported by the PU due
to higher interference levels. This minimizes the utility as compared to the AWGN
channels case. However, the overall performance is still better than that for fast-flat
fading channels scheme proposed in [4].
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Figure 4.9: Average secondary user’s utility at the NE for Rician slow fading

Figure 4.10: Total interference from all secondary users for Rician slow fading
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Figure 4.11: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rician slow fading

4.3

Conclusion

A novel realistic game theoretic scheme is proposed for primary-secondary user power
control in CR networks with slow-flat fading channels. The formulation builds upon
the work in Chapter 3 and proceeds to analyze the power and utilities performance of
the scheme for Rician and Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. In particular, assuming
that a MF detector is used at the secondary systems, detailed analytical derivations
are done to show that the modified game can achieve a unique NE. Overall, the
simulations show that the proposed scheme yields good increases in energy efficiency
for SUs without compromising the QoS for PU. However, Rician and Rayleigh fading
channels have a very direct impact upon the performance of the scheme in terms of
reduced numbers of SUs supported by the PU due to higher interference and lower
utility as compared to AWGN channel.
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Pricing models are now considered to help improve the game formulation. The
goal with this approach is to allow users in non-cooperative (power control) games
to maximize the difference between their utility functions and the chosen pricing
function. Therefore more efficient resource allocation can be achieved as SUs will
only be penalized for aggressive power usage. Along these lines, this treatment builds
upon the work in Chapter 3 by focusing on fast flat-fading models. In particular,
linear pricing functions are used, i.e., pricing factor is multiplied by the transmit
power. Namely this factor is announced by the BS/AP to all users (in the cell) in
order to enforce a NE that improves the aggregate utility of all users at lower power
levels. Thus, the resulting power vector with pricing is Pareto-dominant compared to
that without pricing, but still not Pareto optimal in the sense that one can multiply
the resulting power vector with pricing by a constant, i.e., 0 < β < 1, to achieve
higher utilities for all users. Recall from paper [4] that non-cooperative power control
game without pricing has a quasi-concave utility function for all SUs. Moreover, as
the pricing function is a linear function, it has no impact on the concavity feature as
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shown in [25] and [47].

5.1

Rayleigh Fast-Flat Fading Channels with Pricing

Now in Chapter 3 the derivation of Pe was conducted for Rayleigh fast-flat fading
channels with pricing. Here the path fading coefficient αi was modeled as a Rayleigh
random variable with probability distribution function given in (2.8). Then assuming
BFSK transmission, the Pe for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels was computed and
a modified utility function derived. Extending upon this, a utility function with
pricing is introduced to help increase the number of supported users in the game.

5.1.1

Utility Functions

Generally, SUs should minimize their transmission powers to achieve the best transmission quality. Hence, for the pricing model, the utility function of the i-th SU is
given by [51]:

(Ra) M

uci (pi , p−i ) =

Ri (1 − 2/γ̄i
Ri (1 − 2Pe )M
− cpi =
pi
pi

)

− cpi

(5.1)

where p−i denotes the action vector excluding the action of the i-th user, (i =
0, 1, . . . , N ), Ri is the transmission rate of the i-th SU, and c is positive scalar pricing
factor. This factor is chosen properly to achieve the best possible improvement in the
performance. However, carefully note that the utility function for the PU is still the
same as that in Eq. (3.7). Hence the new modified non-cooperative power control
game with pricing for the proposed realistic channel, Gc5 = (N , Pc , uci (.)), has the
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following components:
1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where the 0-th user is assumed to be the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th
SU.
2) Action space: Pc = (Q × P1c × P2c × . . . × PN c ), where Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents
the PU’s action set and Pic = [pic(min) , pic(max) ] represents the i-th SU’s action
set. Here Q̄0 represents the maximum allowed interference cap of the PU, and
pic(min) and pic(max) respectively, represent the minimum and maximum allowed
transmission power of the i-th SU. The action vector of all users is also denoted
by p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ], where pi ∈ Pic and Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . The PU’s
strategy is to choose the best Q0 at any time, while that of SUs is to adapt their
transmit powers.
3) Utility functions: In this game, uci (pi , p−i ), given in Eq. (5.1), is used to
represent the i-th SU’s utility function for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels without
pricing. In addition, u0 (Q0 , p−0 ), given in Eq. (3.7), is also used to represent the
utility function of the PU.

5.1.2

Existence and Uniqueness of the NE

Assuming that a MF is employed at the SU receivers, the action space defined in [7]
should be modified to guarantee the existence of at least one NE point. Moreover,
it is also sufficient to show that the utility function is concave in pi . Now since the
quasi-concavity of the PU’s utility function has not been changed, one only needs
to show here is the quasi-concavity and the continuity of the utility function of the
SUs. Hence by taking the first derivative of Eq. (5.1) with respect to pi one gets:
Ri
2(M + 1)
∂uci (pi , p−i )
2
− 1) − c
= 2 (1 − (Ra) )M −1 (
(Ra)
∂pi
pi
γ̄i
γ̄i
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Then by setting the above expression to zero, one gets [51]:
s
pci max =

Ri
2
2(M + 1)
(1 − (Ra) )M −1 (
− 1)
(Ra)
c
γ̄i
γ̄i

(5.3)

where pci max is the maximum level of transmit power within the action space Pic .
In order to have feasible (i.e., positive and real) values for pci max , the strategy space
must be defined as follows [51]:
(Ra)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

∈ (2, 2(M + 1))}

(5.4)

Moreover, the second derivative of Eq. (5.1) is given by:
2
M
Ri (1 − γ̄i(Ra) )
∂ 2 uci (pi , p−i )
(Ra)
(Ra)
= 3 (Ra)
(4M 2 +12M +8+2(γ̄i )2 −8(M +1)γ̄i ) (5.5)
2
∂pi
pi (γ̄i
− 2)2

Hence uci (pi , p−i ) is guaranteed to be concave if [51]:
∂ 2 uci (pi , p−i )
(Ra)
(Ra)
(Ra)
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
< 0, ∀γ̄i
2
∂pi

(5.6)

p
(Ra)
(Ra)
where γ̄i(max) = 2(M + 1) + 2(M 2 + M ) is the maximum average SINR and γ̄i(min) =
p
2(M + 1) − 2(M 2 + M ) is the minimum average SINR for a Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channel. Therefore to fulfill both conditions, the action space of the power
control control game with pricing under Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels (i.e.,
Gc5 = (N , P, uci (.)) ) should be modified to be the intersection of the two sets, that
is:
(Ra)

Pic = {pi : γ̄i
(Ra)

(Ra)

(Ra)

(5.7)

p

2(M 2 + M ). Now since

∈ (γ̄ic(min) , γ̄ic(max) )}

(Ra)

where γ̄ic(max) = 2(M + 1) and γ̄ic(min) = 2(M + 1) −
(Ra)

γ̄i

(Ra)

>> 1 (i.e., large γ̄i

) does exist in the above strategy space, one can approx-
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imate Eq. (5.3) as follows [51]:
s
pci max ≈

Now assuming that Ixi =
(Ra)

as γ̄i

PN

j=1
j6=i

Ri 2(M + 1)
(
− 1)
(Ra)
c
γ̄i

(5.8)

h2sj ρ2ji pj + h2s0 ρ2ps P0 , one can rewrite Eq. (3.5)
(Ra)

= (h2si pi )/(Ixi + σn2 ), where γ̄i

is the average SINR for Rayleigh fast-flat

fading channels. Therefore one can rewrite the above equation as follows:
(pci max )3 +

Ri h2si cmax 2 Ri 2(M + 1)(Ixi + σn2 )
(pi ) −
≈0
c
c
h2si

Furthermore, assume that a =

Ri h2si
c

and b =

2)
Ri 2(M +1)(Ixi +σn
,
c
h2si

(5.9)

the only positive and

real solution for Eq. (5.9) is given by [51]:
pci max

√
2
(108b + 12 12a3 + 81b2 ) 3 − 12a
≈
√
1
6(108b + 12 12a3 + 81b2 ) 3

(5.10)

which is a standard vector function i.e., one can follow the same steps as shown in
Eqs. (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15). Thus the NE point is unique and the utility functions
of the SUs satisfy all the required conditions for the existence and uniqueness of at
∗
(p−i ) is assumed to be the
least one NE in the pricing game. Moreover, since ric
∗
∗
∗
best-response function of player i [37], rc (p) = (r1c
(p−1 ), r2c
(p−2 ), . . . , rN
c (p−N )) is
∗
the best-response vector over all SUs, where ric
(p−i ) = min (pci max , pic(max) ) and pci max

is the i-th SU’s transmission power which provides it with the optimum SINR (i.e.,
(Ra)∗

γ̄i

). Since it is also assumed that all SUs have the same efficiency function, this

implies that the SINR corresponding to the best-response is the same for all SUs,
(Ra)∗

∗
∗
i.e., ric
(pi ) = ric
(p−i ). Hence when some of the SUs cannot achieve γ̄i

, they will

transmit at their maximum possible transmission powers, and in this case the NE is
still unique.
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5.1.3

Analysis of Simulation Results

Detailed simulations are also done to model the performance of the Rayleigh channel
game theoretic scheme with pricing. In particular, the following parameters are used:
Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1, hpi = hip = hji = 1 for all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, M = 80,
Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1, µ1 = 10, µ2 = 100 and c = 10+5 . First of all, the PU
utility at the NE is plotted as a function of the number of SUs, N , in Figure 5.1.
Here it is seen that when Q̄0 < I0 , the PU’s utility is severely penalized by the
exponential pricing function. In particular, this happens when N ≥ 26 for AWGN
channel, N ≥ 19 for Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and N ≥ 17 for
Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels without pricing. Meanwhile Figure 5.2 shows the
total interference I0 from all SUs to the PU. As expected, the total interference is
higher for the power control game without pricing due to higher transmit powers.

Figure 5.1: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading with pricing
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Figure 5.2: Total interference from all SUs for Rayleigh fast fading with pricing

Figure 5.3: Average SU’s utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading with pricing
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Next, the average utility of all SUs is shown in Figure 5.3. Here as the number of
SUs increases, each SU (as well as the PU) sees more interference due to the added
SUs. Here each SU has to transmit at a higher power (than that with smaller number
of SUs in the system) in order to achieve the same optimum SINR. In turn, this
reduces the average utility. Once again, the results show that the total performance
of the power control game with pricing is better than that one without pricing. For
example, Figure 5.4 plots the number of SU’s in energy efficient mode. Here one can
see that all SUs will maximize their utility by achieving their optimum SINR i.e.,
(Ra)∗

γ̄i∗ and γ̄i

, when 0 < N ≤ 4 for AWGN channel, when 0 < N ≤ 3 for Rayleigh

fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and when 0 < N ≤ 1 for Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channels without pricing. Otherwise the network cannot afford these SUs
(i.e., no SU can achieve its optimum SINR), and they all transmit at their maximum
possible power level. Finally, Figure 5.5 shows that the sum of the utility achieved
by all SUs at the NE decreases as the number of SUs increases. Overall, the total
performance for power games with pricing is superior to the ones without pricing.
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Figure 5.4: Number of SUs in energy-efficient mode for Rayleigh fast fading with pricing

Figure 5.5: Sum of secondary users’ utility at the NE for Rayleigh fast fading with pricing
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5.2

Rician Fast-Flat Fading Channels with Pricing

Consider the case of Rician fast-flat fading channels now. Here, the derivation of
Pe for these channels (without pricing) was considered in Chapter 3 using BFSK
modulation, i.e., the path fading coefficient αi modeled as a Rician random variable
with probability density function which is given in Eq. (2.9). Leveraging this
baseline, a modified utility function with pricing is now introduced to help boost
the total number of SUs that the system can support.

5.2.1

Utility Functions with Pricing

The utility function of the i-th SU with pricing is given as follows:
(Rice) M

uĉi (pi , p−i )

Ri (1 − 2/γ̄i
Ri (1 − 2Pe )M
− ĉpi =
=
pi
pi

)

− ĉpi (5.11)

where ĉ is positive scalar pricing factor which is chosen to achieve the best possible
improvement in the performance. However, since the utility function for the PU is
still the same as given in Eq. (3.7), the new modified power control game with pricing
for the proposed realistic channel, Gĉ6 = (N , Pĉ , uĉi (.)) has the following components:

1) Players: N = {0, 1, . . . , N } is the index set of the users currently in the cell,
where the 0-th user is assumed to be the PU and i = 1, . . . , N represents the i-th
SU.
2) Action space: Pĉ = (Q × P1ĉ × P2ĉ × . . . × PN ĉ ), where Q = [0, Q̄0 ] represents
the PU’s action set and Piĉ = [piĉ(min) , piĉ(max) ] represents the i-th SU’s action
set. Here Q̄0 represents the maximum allowed interference cap of the PU, and
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piĉ(min) and piĉ(max) respectively, represent the minimum and maximum allowed
transmission power of the i-th SU. The action vector of all users is also denoted
by p = [Q0 , p1 , . . . , pN ], where pi ∈ Piĉ and Q0 ∈ Q for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . Overall, the
PU’s strategy is to choose the best Q0 whereas that of SUs is to adapt their transmit
powers.
3) Utility functions: In this game the utility function uĉi (pi , p−i ), given in Eq.
(5.11), is used to represent the i-th SU’s utility function for Rician fast-flat fading
channels. In addition, u0 (Q0 , p−0 ), given in Eq. (3.7), is also used to represent the
utility function of the PU.

5.2.2

Existence and Uniqueness of the NE

Assuming MF receivers are used at SUs system, the action space defined for Rician
fast-flat fading channels can be modified to guarantee the existence of at least one
NE point for the pricing game. Moreover, it is also sufficient to show that the utility
function is concave in pi . Now since the PU’s utility function has not been changed,
and the authors in [7] have proven its quasi-concavity, one only needs to show the
quasi-concavity and the continuity of the utility function of the SUs. Therefore by
taking the first derivative of Eq. (5.11) with respect to pi one gets:
∂uĉi (pi , p−i )
2
Ri
2(M + 1)
= 2 (1 − (Rice) )M −1 ( (Rice) − 1) − ĉ
∂pi
pi
γ̄i
γ̄i

(5.12)

By further setting the above expression to zero, one obtains:
s
pci max =

Ri
2
2(M + 1)
(1 − (Rice) )M −1 ( (Rice) − 1)
ĉ
γ̄i
γ̄i

(5.13)

where pĉi max is the maximum transmission power within the action space Piĉ . Now
in order to have feasible (i.e., positive and real) values for pĉi max , the strategy space
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for the realistic channels model must be defined as follows:
(Rice)

Pi = {pi : γ̄i

∈ (2, 2(M + 1))}

(5.14)

Moreover, the second derivative of Eq. (5.11) is given by:
2
M
∂ 2 uĉi (pi , p−i )
Ri (1 − γ̄i(Rice) )
(Rice) 2
(Rice)
= 3 (Rice)
(4M 2 +12M +8+2(γ̄i
) −8(M +1)γ̄i
) (5.15)
2
∂pi 2
pi (γ̄i
− 2)

Hence, uĉi (pi , p−i ) is concave if:
∂ 2 uĉi (pi , p−i )
(Rice)
(Rice)
(Rice)
< 0, ∀γ̄i
∈ (γ̄i(min) , γ̄i(max) )
∂pi 2
(Rice)

(5.16)

(Rice)

where γ̄i(max) and γ̄i(min) are as defined earlier in Section 3.2.2 for the game without
pricing. Therefore to fulfill both conditions, the action space of the power control control game with pricing under Rician fast-flat fading channel, i.e., Gĉ6 = (N , P, uĉi (.)),
should be modified to be the intersection of the two sets, that is:
(Rice)

Piĉ = {pi : γ̄i

(Rice)

(Rice)

(Rice)

(Rice)

∈ (γ̄iĉ(min) , γ̄iĉ(max) )}

where γ̄iĉ(max) = 2(M + 1) and γ̄iĉ(min) = 2(M + 1) −
(Rice)

γ̄i

(Rice)

>> 1, (i.e., large γ̄i

(5.17)

p
2(M 2 + M ). Now, since

) does exist in the strategy space shown in Eq. (5.17),

one can approximate Eq. (5.13) by:
s
pĉi max

≈

Ri 2(M + 1)
( (Rice) − 1)
ĉ
γ̄i
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(5.18)
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P
2 2
2 2
2
Assuming that IRice(i) = ( N
j=1, hsj ρji pj + hs0 ρps P0 )(s + 1), then one can rewrite Eq.
j6=i

(3.5) as follows:
2

(Rice)
γ̄i

(Rice)

where γ̄i

h2si pi es
=
IRice(i) + σn2

(5.19)

is the average SINR for Rician fast-flat fading channels.

Also by using Eq. (5.19), one can rewrite the above equation as follows:
(pĉi max )3 +

Assuming that a =

Ri
ĉ

and b =

Ri ĉmax Ri 2(M + 1)(IRice(i) + σn2 )
p
−
≈0
ĉ i
ĉ
h2si es2

2
Ri 2(M +1)(IRice(i) +σn )
,
2
2
s
ĉ
h e

(5.20)

the only positive and real solution

si

for Eq. (5.20) is given by:
pĉi max

√
2
(108b + 12 12a3 + 81b2 ) 3 − 12a
≈
√
1
6(108b + 12 12a3 + 81b2 ) 3

(5.21)

which is a standard vector function, i.e., one can follow the same steps which are
shown in Eqs. (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15). Thus the NE point is unique, and the
utility functions of the SUs satisfy all the required conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of at least one NE in the power control game with pricing for Rician fast∗
flat fading channels. Moreover, since riĉ
(p−i ) is assumed to be the best-response
∗
∗
∗
function of player i [37], rĉ (p) = (r1ĉ
(p−1 ), r2ĉ
(p−2 ), . . . , rN
ĉ (p−N )) is the best∗
response vector over all SUs, where riĉ
(p−i ) = min (pĉi max , piĉ(max) ) and pĉi max is the
(Rice)∗

i-th SU’s transmission power which provides it with the optimum SINR (i.e., γ̄i

).

Since it is assumed that all SUs have the same efficiency function, this implies that
∗
the SINR corresponding to the best-response is the same for all SUs, i.e., riĉ
(pi ) =
(Rice)∗

∗
riĉ
(p−i ). Hence when some of the SUs cannot achieve γ̄i

, they will send at their

maximum possible transmission powers, and in this case the NE is still unique.
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5.2.3

Analysis of Simulation Results

Detailed simulations are done in MATLAB to model the performance of the Rician
channel game theoretic scheme with pricing. In particular, the following parameters
are used: Q̄0 = 5 , ρpi = ρip = ρji = 0.1, hpi = hip = hji = 1 for all i , j ∈ {1, . . . , N
}, M = 80, Ri = 1, γ¯0 = 10, σn2 = 1, µ1 = 10, µ2 = 100, s = 1 and ĉ = 10+5 . First,
Figure 5.6 plots the utility of the PU at the NE as a function of the number of SUs,
N . Here it is seen that when Q̄0 < I0 , the PU’s utility is severely penalized by
the exponential pricing function. Namely, this occurs when N ≥ 26 for the AWGN
channel, N ≥ 21 for Rician fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and N ≥ 19 for
Rayleigh fast-flat fading channel with pricing. However, the total performance is
better than that for the Rician fast-flat fading channels game without pricing which
was shown in Section 3.2.4. Meanwhile the total interference, I0 , from all SUs to the
PU is also shown in Figure 5.7. As expected, the total interference is higher for the
power control game without pricing due to higher transmit powers. On the other
hand, due to lack of LOS component, the total interference under Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channels is higher than that for Rician fast-flat fading channels.
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Figure 5.6: Primary user’s utility at the NE for Rician fast fading with pricing

Figure 5.7: Total interference from all SUs for Rician fast fading with pricing
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Figure 5.8: Sum of secondary users’ utility at the NE for Rician fast fading with pricing

Next, Figure 5.9 shows that the aggregate utility achieved by all SUs decreases
by increasing the number of SUs at the NE. These results show that the sum of all
SUs’ utility has a unique maximum when N = 4 for AWGN channel, when N = 5 for
Rician fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and when N = 3 for Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channels with pricing. In addition, Figure 5.10 also shows the number of SUs
that the PU can afford as a function of the total number of SUs. This could be
any number of SUs as long as Q̄0 > I0 , where N = 25 for AWGN channel, N = 22
for Rician fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and N = 19 for Rayleigh fast-flat
fading channels with pricing. As expected, the total number of SUs that the PU can
afford is lower in the case of Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels model. Meanwhile,
Figure 5.10 plots the average utility of the SUs. Here as the number of SUs increases,
each SU (as well as the PU) sees more interference due to the increased user counts.
Thus each SU has to transmit at a higher power (than that with smaller number of
SUs in the system) in order to achieve the same optimum SINR. This reduces the
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Figure 5.9: The maximum number of SUs supported for Rician fast fading with pricing
average utility, i.e., when N < 4 for AWGN channel, N < 5, and N < 3 for both
Rician and Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels, respectively. Here the decrease in the
average SU utility is dominated by the increase of the number of SUs, and hence the
aggregate utility of all SUs still increases. Conversely the aggregate utility decreases
due to the decay of the average SU utility.
Finally, the number of SUs in energy efficient mode is also plotted in Figure 5.11.
Here one can see that all SUs will maximize their utility by achieving their optimum
(Rice)∗

SINR, i.e., γ̄i∗ , γ̄i

(Ra)∗

and γ̄i

, when 0 < N ≤ 4 for AWGN channel, when

0 < N ≤ 3 for Rician fast-flat fading channels with pricing, and when 0 < N ≤ 1 for
Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels with pricing. Otherwise the network cannot afford
these SUs, i.e., no SU can achieve its optimum SINR, and they will all transmit
at their maximum possible power level, which equals P̄i = 20 for AWGN channel
(max)

and Pi

for both Rician and Rayleigh fast-flat fading channels. Overall, the total

performance for the game with pricing is superior to that without pricing.
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Figure 5.10: Average SU’s utility at the NE for Rician fast fading with pricing

Figure 5.11: Number of SUs in energy-efficient mode for Rician fast fading with pricing
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5.3

Conclusions

This chapter introduces a novel primary-secondary user power control solution with
pricing. This formulation incorporates the primary users as active decision makers,
and analyzes the power and utility performance of the scheme for both Rayleigh
and Rician fast-flat fading channels with linear pricing function. In particular,
detailed derivations are done to show that the modified realistic game can achieve a
unique NE point. Simulations results also confirm that the proposed scheme yields
good energy efficiency for SUs without compromising transmission quality for PUs.
However, Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels are seen to have direct impact
on the performance of the pricing game in terms of reduced numbers secondary
users supported by the primary user due to higher interference and lower utility as
compared to AWGN channel. Moreover, pricing helps shift the equilibrium point to
lower power regimes (as compared to non-pricing games). However, utility values are
still higher and SUs can achieve increased battery life with reduced power usages.
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This dissertation presents a comprehensive modeling of user behaviors in CR networks. In particular, a novel primary-secondary user power control framework is
developed using an extended game-theoretic approach (Chapter 2). The formulation
builds upon recent studies by incorporating primary users as active decision makers
in the game. This framework is extended and used to analyze the power and utility
performance of the game for both fast- and slow-flat fading Rayleigh and Rician
channels (Chapters 3 and 4). Detailed analytical derivations are also performed for
each game instance in order to prove the existence and uniqueness of the NE point.
Finally, pricing functions are also incorporated into the game-theoretic formulation
to help further improve the model and support larger numbers of users, i.e., for both
Rayleigh and Rician fast-flat fading channels (Chapter 5). The overall conclusions of
this effort are now presented along with some discussions on future work directions.
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6.1

Conclusions

Foremost, the analytical formulations confirm that the proposed game-theoretic
schemes can yield unique NE points for the various fast and slow flat-fading channel
models. In addition, realistic simulation results also show that the proposed powercontrol strategies can yield realistic energy savings (efficiency) for SUs without unnecessarily compromising the transmission quality for the PU. However, the findings
also indicate that Rayleigh and Rician flat-fading channel models (fast and slow) have
a very direct impact on the performance of CR networks. Specifically, these channels
yield notably lower performances versus the more basic AWGN channel model, i.e.,
in terms of fewer numbers of supported users (due to higher levels of interference) and
lower throughput per-unit-power (utility). Hence the AWGN model is deemed to be
overly optimistic and not very reflective of realistic transmission conditions. However,
the introduction of pricing strategies into the game can yield sizeable improvements
in overall bandwidth efficiency of the game-theoretic power control strategies.

6.2

Future Directions

Overall, this dissertation presents a strong set of contributions in the area of gametheoretic modeling of CR networks under realistic fast and slow fading channel conditions. As such, this foundation opens up many new avenues for future research work.
Some of these are now detailed here. First, new efforts can look at incorporating
the Nakagami fading channel model [47] into the game-theoretic formulation. In
particular, this model closely matches empirical measurements for many real-world
conditions, and hence can provide a valuable addition to the proposed framework.
Next, rate control features can also be added, as this topic is becoming an important
concern in increasingly dense cellular networks with surging data transfer demands.
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Moreover, the impact of more advanced LMMSE receivers at the SUs can also be
studied. It is envisioned that these detectors will improve overall capacity efficiency
in CR networks and thereby allow more users to be supported. Finally, spatial
diversity techniques can be considered for mitigating the effects of fading channel
behaviors to further improve the overall performance.
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